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Francisco de Vitoria’s Normative Ideas and 
the Beginnings of International Law: A 
Colonial Ethnocentric Discourse, or a Bona 
Fide Effort to Construct Just International 
Norms? 
BY YURI G. MANTILLA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The fragmentation of international law, its legal positivist founda-
tion, and the influence of critical approaches in its deconstruction has 
shaped debates about international law’s present and future. To properly 
understand prevalent international normative ideas and to think about po-
tential improvements in constructing a just normative international order, 
it is essential to analyze the genealogy of the ideas that created interna-
tional law. This article focuses on the origins of international law in the 
16th century normative ideas of Francisco de Vitoria and his proposal to 
apply them to the inter-civilizational relations between indigenous na-
tions of the New World and European States. Considering the importance 
of inter-civilizational relations in the 21st century and the increasing 
recognition of indigenous peoples as important international actors, the 
analysis of these ideas is of special importance.1 
Beginning in the 1910s, Spanish authors including Vicente Beltrán 
de Heredia, Luis Alonso Getino, Venancio Diego Carro, and Teófilo 
 
* Yuri Mantilla is Professor of Law at Liberty University School of Law. Professor Mantilla holds 
a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, an LL.M. degree from American 
University Washington College of Law, an LL.B. equivalent, from Taras Shevchenko University 
of Kiev, Ukraine. He has done undergraduate studies at the University of San Andres School of 
Law in La Paz, Bolivia. He was awarded a Graduate Certificate in International Relations by Har-
vard University Extension School. 
1. This writing is the law review article version of my Ph.D. thesis. See Yuri G. Mantilla, 
Francisco de Vitoria, the Spanish Scholastic Perspective on Law, and the Conquest of the Inca 
Empire: Universal Justice or Ethnocentric Colonialism (Jan. 25, 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Aberdeen) (on file with author). 
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Urdanoz, systematically promoted the view that Francisco de Vitoria was 
the founder of international law.2 They believed that Vitoria’s interna-
tional legal ideas were consistent with principles of international justice 
and could legitimately apply to the relations between nations from diverse 
civilizations.3 In English-speaking countries, James Brown Scott, a lead-
ing scholar on Vitoria’s ideas, also promoted this perspective.4 In the 
1990s, contrary to the traditional interpretation of Vitoria’s ideas, a per-
spective emerged that indicated that he was the founder of a colonial, 
ethnocentric, and unjust discourse of international law.5 From that view-
point, international law was established to justify the Spanish conquest 
and colonization of the New World.6 In 1996, Antony Anghie published 
his article entitled Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of In-
ternational Law.7 Anghie’s interpretation is one of the most influential 
sources on Vitoria’s doctrines as a colonial ethnocentric international 
normative discourse. Well recognized international legal scholars includ-
ing Antony Anghie, Bret Bowden, and Richard Williams, also believe 
that Vitoria’s law of nations’ doctrines articulate an unjust ethnocentric 
discourse that has greatly influenced the discipline of international law.8 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 
In the 21st century, there is an increasing influence of political ideas 
that are challenging processes of global economic integration. These 
views also question the contributions of international law in sustaining a 
peaceful international order.9 They contest the contributions of interna-
tional law in effectively addressing issues of international trade relations, 
international human rights, and the protection of the environment and 
others. Besides the nationalist populist critique of international law, there 
 
 2. Id. at 67-69; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
58-63 (1950). 
 3. See Mantilla, supra note 1, at 67-69. 
 4. See generally JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS (1934). 
 5. Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 326 (1996); see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 36. 
 6. Anghie, supra note 5, at 326; see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 36. 
 7. Anghie, supra note 5, at 321. 
 8. See Pablo Zapatero, Legal Imagination in Vitoria. The Power of Ideas, 11 J. HIST. INT’L 
L. 221, 268-71 (2009) (describing the nature of the critical analysis of Vitoria’s ideas regarding 
international law). 
 9. See Anne M. Orford, International Law and the Populist Moment: A Comment on Martti 
Koskenniemi's Enchanted By the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. (2020). 
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is an influential perspective that sustains the view that international law 
is an inherently biased unjust system because of its colonial origins.10 This 
point of view is based on strong criticisms of the writings of Francisco de 
Vitoria, who is considered one of the founders of the discipline of inter-
national law.11 
In the Spanish 16th century setting, there were efforts to recognize 
the existence of normative ideas that could justly, and universally apply 
to all civilizations.12 Regarding the 16th century view of universality and 
its relation to natural law, Georg Cavallar said: “[t]he core idea of natural 
law cosmopolitanism is that natural law is universal and should therefore 
not be limited in scope, that is, it should be applied to all human beings.”13 
In the Spanish 16th century historical context, there were two influential 
schools of thought regarding the universality of the law of nations. The 
first one, represented by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, indicated that the nat-
ural law of nations did not apply to indigenous nations because they were 
less than human.14 The other view, represented by Bartolomé de las 
Casas, indicated that the natural law of nations applied to all nations in-
cluding indigenous ones.15 
Georg Cavallar defines intellectual cosmopolitanism as: “a way of 
thinking, a cognitive orientation with the key feature of impartiality.”16 In 
the historical context of the 16th century, the concept of impartiality was 
expressed in the concept of universal justice, which was understood as 
what was owed to each person and nation.17 In the 16th century, Priest 
Montesinos, a Spanish missionary in the New World, was one of the first 
to articulate a universal perspective against the conquest of the New 
World.18 Montesinos believed that the Spanish actions in indigenous ter-
ritories were against principles of universal justice in the New World be-
cause they violated the human dignity of indigenous people.19 Montesinos 
 
 10. Mantilla, supra note 1, at 27, 143-44. 
 11. Id. at 142-44. 
 12. See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 
17-23 (1965); see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 30-32. 
 13. See Georg Cavallar, Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolf and Vattel: Accomplices of Euro-
pean Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans, 10 J. HIST. INT’L L. 181, 185 (2008). 
 14. See JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, TRATADO SOBRE LAS JUSTAS CAUSAS DE LA GUERRA 
CONTRA LOS INDIOS 12 (Fondo De Cultura Económica 3d ed., Manuel García Pelayo trans., 1996). 
 15. See generally BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, 1 TRATADOS 21-23 (Juan Pérez ed., Carlos 
Millares & Rafael Moreno trans., 2d ed. 1997). 
 16. Cavallar, supra note 13, at 185. 
 17. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, LA JUSTICIA 20-21 (Luis Frayle Delgado trans., 2001). 
 18. See HANKE, supra note 12, at 17-19. 
 19. Id. at 17-22. 
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also believed that it was as important to defend the interests of indigenous 
nations as it was to defend the interests of his own country, Spain.20 
Similarly, Bartolomé de las Casas, like Montesinos, believed that 
the Spanish conquest of indigenous nations was contrary to principles of 
universal justice. This was because it was contrary to the interests of in-
digenous people.21 Bartolomé de las Casas rejected Spanish legal justifi-
cations for the conquest and colonization of the New World. His ideas 
were an effort to transcend Spain’s 16th century national interests and 
embrace a universal perspective which considered the wellbeing of indig-
enous civilizations. That view was based on the belief in the existence of 
one universal human nature and the equality of all human beings, because 
they were created in God’s image. 
Contrary to De las Casas’ view of universality, Juan Ginés de 
Sepúlveda believed that it was in the best interest of Spain and humankind 
to impose Spanish colonial rule to “ethnically inferior” indigenous peo-
ple. In this case, the interests of indigenous nations were irrelevant be-
cause they were not considered to be members of humankind. Based on 
that view, Sepúlveda defended Spanish colonial policies, which he con-
sidered to be consistent with universal justice. Sepúlveda’s perspective 
on universal norms was based on the anthropological presupposition of 
the ethnic inferiority of indigenous people.22 That type of ethnocentric 
understanding of the natural law of nations was used to impose the inter-
ests of one society and one ethnic group, as if they were universal to oth-
ers. 
The main difference between 16th century Spanish views of univer-
sal justice is that one view considered not only the interests of Spain, but 
also the interests of indigenous people, while the other view equated uni-
versal justice with Spanish national interests. For authors such as 
Sepúlveda, Spain was the nation that represented universal European val-
ues against “infidel” and “sub-human” cultures such as those of the in-
digenous people of the New World.23 
If Francisco de Vitoria tried to transcend his own intellectual and 
cultural traditions, and the interests of his country, then his ideas could 
be considered an endeavour to seek internationally just results. But in the 
16th century historical context, Vitoria’s ideas could have been consid-
ered just and universal if he considered the interests not only of his own 
country, but also the interests of indigenous nations. 
 
 20. Id. at 17-23. 
 21. See DE LAS CASAS, supra note 15, at 19-23. 
 22. See GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 12. 
 23. See generally id. at 109-13. 
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Moreover, in the 16th century historical context, the concept of uni-
versal justice was closely related to the doctrine of human nature. If there 
was a universal human nature, then the norms of the natural law of nations 
could have been equally applied to Spain and the indigenous nations of 
the New World. If there were diverse human natures, and the indigenous 
nations of the New World were inherently inferior and sub-human, then 
those norms could not have been equally applied to nations from diverse 
civilizations. 
The most important and original aspect of Vitoria’s writings are 
found in his relecciones, in which he addressed topics of key theoretical 
and practical importance for the Spanish 16th century context. Once a 
year, as part of the academic system at the University of Salamanca, pro-
fessors were required to lecture for the entire campus. These were known 
as relecciones (re-readings) which were conferences on topics of special 
importance. The relecciones are the main source of Vitoria’s doctrines on 
the law of nations and the conquest of indigenous political communities. 
Vitoria had fifteen relecciones, thirteen of which were published based 
on notes taken by his students.24 
In his writings on the law of nations and colonialism, Vitoria men-
tioned three concrete historical events regarding the Spanish conquest of 
the New World. First, in his letter to Father Arcos (1534) he addressed 
the issue of the conquest of the Inca Empire.25 This document is one of 
the most important sources on Vitoria’s views on law and colonialism. In 
that letter, Vitoria condemned the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire 
and the Spanish actions in the massacre of Cajamarca. Second, in De tem-
peratia, he addressed the issue of cannibalism and human sacrifice prac-
tised in the Aztec realm in the Yucatan peninsula. Third, in his writing on 
De indis, he mentioned the Spanish alliances with minority indigenous 
groups as a just cause for war. 
Vitoria’s international jurisprudential doctrines on the laws applica-
ble to the relations between nations of diverse civilizations should be 
evaluated by considering philosophical, theological, and anthropological 
presuppositions which influenced his legal doctrines. Regarding the con-
cept of doctrine, Professor Anthony Carty writes: 
An essential element of doctrine is that it is supposed to have 
authority. The theory, opinion, etc. must be capable of exercis-
ing influence. Coming from the tradition of Roman law and 
 
 24. See LUIS G. ALONSO GETINO, 1 RELECCIONES TEOLÓGICAS DEL MAESTRO FRAY 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA viii-ix (1933) (analyzing Vitoria’s lectures). 
 25. Francisco de Vitoria, Letter to Miguel Arcos, OP Salamanca, 8 November (1534), in 1 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 331-33 (Jeremy Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., 12th prtg. 2010). 
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canon law, particularly in French and German legal communi-
ties, doctrine has authority not as a source of law as such, but as 
freely and spontaneously held opinion, which is likely to be-
come accepted.26 
In the 16th century, when Spain conquered the Inca and other indig-
enous nations of the New World, there was not an international system of 
positive law applicable to the international relations between Spain and 
the nations of the New World. To find out the nature of Vitoria’s interna-
tional normative doctrines, it is necessary to consider diverse systems of 
law that applied to nations from diverse civilizations and its mutual rela-
tions in the 16th century historical context. It is important to analyze Vi-
toria’s ideas not only on the law of nations, but also on Spanish colonial 
laws, which were applied to indigenous nations, and on natural law which 
was applicable to all human beings. 
Francisco de Vitoria’s normative ideas, which influenced the Span-
ish scholastic perspective on law, were shaped by his philosophical, the-
ological, and anthropological views of the Inca and other indigenous na-
tions. The facts about the history of the Andean and other indigenous 
civilizations were gathered by Spanish historians who were witnesses of 
the Spanish conquest of the New World.27 The historical writings of Span-
ish authors were the source of information that shaped the normative doc-
trines of Vitoria and other Spanish scholastic thinkers on indigenous na-
tions.28 
In analyzing the normative relations between Spain and the indige-
nous nations of the New World, Francisco de Vitoria highlights the key 
 
 26. ANTHONY CARTY, PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2007). 
 27. Authors such as Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Fray Gerónimo de Mendieta, Fray Diego 
de Duran, Bernabé Cobo, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, and other Spanish historians wrote about 
the Inca and Aztec empires from a biased perspective. Despite this, their works are fundamental 
sources for the study of the Inca and Aztec societies. See generally JUAN DE BETANZOS, SUMA Y 
NARRACIÓN DE LOS INCAS (1968); BERNABE COBO, HISTORY OF THE INCA EMPIRE: AN ACCOUNT 
OF THE INDIANS’ CUSTOMS AND THEIR ORIGIN, TOGETHER WITH A TREATISE ON INCA LEGENDS, 
HISTORY, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Roland Hamilton trans., Univ. of Texas Press rev. ed. 1979); 
BERNARDINO DE SAHAGUN, FLORENTINE CODEX: INTRODUCTIONS AND INDICES (Arthur J.O. An-
derson & Charles Dibble trans., Univ. of Utah Press 1982); JOSE DE ACOSTA, HISTORIA NATURAL 
Y MORAL DE LAS INDIAS (1986); FRAY GERÓNIMO DE MENDIETA, HISTORIA ECLESIASTICA 
INDIANA II (2002); PEDRO SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, THE HISTORY OF THE INCAS (Brian S. Bauer 
& Vania Smith trans., Univ. of Texas Press 2007).      
 28. See Arnoldo Mora Rodriguez, La Identidad Latinoamericana: Enfoque Filosofico, 14 
REVISTA COMUNICACION, Aug.-Dec. 2005, at 27, 29. Professor Mora provides an excellent anal-
ysis of the contributions of Spanish historians and philosophers to the formation of the Latin Amer-
ican ideas. 
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importance of theology as the source of all other areas of knowledge.29 
Theology had a direct influence in his doctrines on the law of nations and 
natural law.30 Vitoria believed in the existence of universal objective 
norms applicable to all human beings and nations. He was concerned with 
the renewal of the image of God (imago Dei), of human beings, and the 
eternal implications of the extreme violent actions of Spanish conquerors 
and indigenous nations in the New World. 
III.  FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 
On October 4, 1483, Francisco de Vitoria was born in the city of 
Burgos, Castile, Spain.31 He became one of the most influential authors 
in the history of international law. Vitoria, together with Hugo Grotius 
and Alberico Gentili, is considered one of the founders of international 
law.32 In 1526, Vitoria became a professor of theology at the University 
of Salamanca and taught there until he died in 1546.33 He replaced the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard for Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae as 
the main text for the study of theology.34 In his lectures, he applied gen-
eral theological principles to concrete and important issues of his time 
such as the Spanish conquest of the indigenous nations of the New World. 
As a result of these lectures, Vitoria developed original ideas about the 
Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World. His views on the 
law of nations were expressed in his lectures titled De indis, De iure belli, 
and De temperatia, among others. 
To assess Vitoria’s ideas, it is important to consider the specific his-
torical context which influenced his thinking. His ideas were those of a 
 
 29. See, e.g., VICENTE BELTRAN DE HEREDIA, LOS MANUSCRITOS DEL MAESTRO FRAY 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA (1928) (demonstrating the prevalence of theology in Vitoria’s legal doc-
trines). 
 30. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 3, 10, 40. For example, regarding the doubt about 
the justice of the conquest of the New World, he wrote:  
It is not the province of lawyers, or not of lawyers alone, to pass sentence in this ques-
tion. Since these barbarians we speak of are not subjects [of the Spanish Crown] by 
human law (iure humano), as I shall show in a moment their affairs cannot be judged 
by human statutes (leges humanae), but only by divine ones, in which jurists are not 
sufficiently versed to form an opinion on their own.  
Id. at 238. 
 31. See, e.g., RAMÓN HERNÁNDEZ MARTIN, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA: VIDA Y PENSAMIENTO 
INTERNACIONALISTA 17 (1995). 
 32. See, e.g., ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 58 (1950). 
 33. JUAN BELDA PLANS, LA ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA Y LA RENOVACION DE LA TEOLOGIA 
EN EL SIGLO XVI 326 (2000). 
 34. Id. at 328. 
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Spanish Catholic theologian who lived in the 16th century.35 Thus, Vito-
ria wrote about the conquest of the New World and the laws applicable 
to nations as a reaction to the Spanish conquest of the Inca realm. To find 
out if Vitoria’s international normative ideas were inherently unjust, or if 
they provided a beginning for just norms applicable to international rela-
tions between different civilizations, it is essential to understand Vitoria’s 
views of concrete indigenous nations such as the Inca. 
If Vitoria made a bona fide effort to transcend his cultural settings 
and proposed ideas which could have benefited the interests of indige-
nous nations, then his ideas could have been internationally just in the 
16th century Spanish context. If his ideas were a normative discourse to 
justify the Spanish conquest and colonization of indigenous nations under 
a false claim of international justice, then he was one of the main contrib-
utors to the establishment of a biased, unjust, and ethnocentric interna-
tional law. 
To answer the question regarding the nature of Vitoria’s interna-
tional normative ideas, it is important to attempt to understand his views 
as they were understood in the 16th century Spanish historical context.36 
Consistent with Professor Quentin Skinner’s view of history, it can be 
noted that Spanish scholastic thinkers, including Vitoria, were focused on 
certain issues that were specific to their historical and ideological con-
text.37 To interpret the facts of the Spanish conquest of the New World, 
Vitoria used theological and philosophical concepts which were mean-
ingful to his 16th century Spanish audience. Vitoria’s audience believed 
in a Christian/Catholic worldview of reality. These theological and phil-
osophical concepts became the basis of Vitoria’s normative ideas on the 
laws applicable to nations from diverse civilisations. 
Here, applying Quentin Skinner’s historical approach in this article, 
the justice of Vitoria’s and other Spanish scholastic thinkers’ ideas should 
be measured consistently with 16th century views.38 In regards to the im-
portance of analyzing ideas consistently with the intellectual context in 
which they were written, Skinner writes: 
I am only pleading for the historical task to be conceived as that 
of trying so far as possible to think as our ancestors thought and 
to see things their way. What this requires is that we should re-
cover the concepts they possessed, the distinctions they drew 
 
 35. See generally 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 3 (2002) 
(explaining the importance of historical context). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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and the chains of reasoning they followed in their attempts to 
make sense of their world.39 
The nature and intentions of Vitoria’s writings can be interpreted by 
understanding his audience. Vitoria communicated to an audience of 16th 
century Spanish government officials, professors, and church leaders. 
Therefore, to comprehend his ideas, it is essential to know the legal, the-
ological, and philosophical languages which had a rational meaning for 
his 16th century European audience. As a professor and friar, he often 
interacted in the Spanish cities of Valladolid and Salamanca with former 
catholic missionaries and former Spanish conquerors. In their dialogues 
with Vitoria, they wanted to appease their consciences and receive for-
giveness for their crimes to ensure their eternal salvation.40 
Historical facts about the indigenous nations of the New World, 
which Vitoria knew or should have known, are essential to understanding 
the nature of Vitoria’s international normative ideas.41 Vitoria specifically 
only mentioned the conquest of the Inca Empire, the indigenous nations’ 
practice of human sacrifice in Yucatan, and the Spanish alliances with the 
Tlaxcala, a minority indigenous group. The consideration of these facts 
helps understand the implications of Vitoria’s international normative 
ideas for the relations between civilizations. It also helps answer the ques-
tion of the application of norms, which emerged in one civilization, to the 
international relations between diverse civilizations. 
Vitoria believed that one of the first widespread violations of natural 
law and the law of nations during the invasion of the Inca realm occurred 
in the city of Cajamarca. In a letter written on November 8, 1534, to his 
friend Miguel de Arcos, Vitoria expressed his rejection of Francisco Pi-
zarro and other Spanish conquerors’ violent actions against the Inca peo-
ple in the city of Cajamarca.42 This was the beginning of his intellectual 
task to develop a discourse on the laws applicable to Spain’s international 
relations with the indigenous nations of the New World. 
Vitoria’s letter to Father Arcos shows the critical importance of the 
concept of human nature in Vitoria’s view of the conquest of the Inca 
 
 39. Id. at 47. 
 40. LUCIANO PEREÑA, LA ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA, PROCESO A LA CONQUISTA DE 
AMERICA 19-22 (1986); see also FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS O LIBERTAD DE LOS 
INDIOS XXXI-XLI (Luciano Pereña & Jose M. Pérez Prendes eds., 1967). 
 41. See HORACIO ZAPATER, AMERICA LATINA: ENSAYOS DE ETNOHISTORIA 71-91 (Marcelo 
Rojas Vasquez ed. 2007) (explaining and analyzing historical facts regarding the Aztec and Inca 
civilizations during the 1519-1621 period). 
 42. See ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA, CARTA MAGNA DE LOS INDIOS: FUENTES 
CONSTITUCIONALES 1534-1609, at 35-40 (Luciano Pereña & Carlos Baciero eds., Consejo Supe-
rior de Investigaciones Científicas 1988).  
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Empire. Vitoria’s view of human nature is a central aspect of his theolog-
ical and philosophical doctrines, which served as the foundation for his 
ideas on political communities and the laws applicable to nations from 
diverse civilizations. For Vitoria, if indigenous people were sub-human, 
then they could not violate the laws applicable to human beings.43 How-
ever, if they were fully human, then natural law applied to them and their 
human dignity should have been respected.44 Vitoria’s letter entails a 
strong criticism of the Spanish conquerors’ actions in the Inca realm. The 
Spanish wars in the Andean region were contrary to Francisco de Vito-
ria’s scholastic perspective on the laws applicable to nations; Vitoria had 
reasonable doubt about the legality of the conquest of the New World.45 
This perspective was contrary to the Spanish government’s colonial pol-
icy, which was justified by normative instruments such as the Requeri-
miento, Alexandrian Papal Bulls, and Capitulation of Toledo. 
IV.  VITORIA’S REJECTION OF SPANISH COLONIAL LAW DOCTRINES AND 
THE CONQUEST OF THE INCA EMPIRE 
In the 16th century context, prevalent European medieval normative 
doctrines were applied to justify the conquest of indigenous people’s na-
tions, which also included the Inca. The legal ideas reflected in the Alex-
andrian Papal Bulls, Requerimiento, and the Capitulations of Toledo 
served as a normative discourse to justify the Spanish conquest of the 
New World. Vitoria criticized the doctrinal foundations of these legal in-
struments. Also, Vitoria’s rejection of the Requerimiento was especially 
relevant concerning the conquest of the Inca Empire, since this document 
was the main legal foundation for the Spanish conquest and unjust use of 
force in the Andean Region. 
Along with its political and military powers, Spain also used its laws 
to justify its conquest and subsequent colonization of overseas territories. 
The Spanish laws used to justify Spain’s conquests in the New World 
reflected the influence of theological and philosophical presuppositions 
about the nature of indigenous people and political authority. The Alex-
andrian Papal Bulls, Requerimiento, and Capitulations were based on 
the doctrine of the Pope’s universal authority on earthly matters and the 
 
 43. Id. at 39. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 37. 
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view of indigenous people as ethnically inferior and in need of Spanish 
protection.46 
The doctrine of universal papal authority, on spiritual and earthly 
matters, served as one of the main foundations for the creation of norms 
applicable to the international relations of Spain with indigenous nations 
of the New World. The laws, which justified the Spanish actions for the 
conquest and colonization of the New World, were also based on theo-
logical and philosophical presuppositions on human nature and political 
authority. One of the main presuppositions of normative colonial Spanish 
instruments was the inherent superiority of Spain’s political authority 
over indigenous nations.47 
In 16th century Spain, Jews, Muslims, Incas, and other non-Chris-
tian people were considered infidels.48 Unlike Muslim and Jewish people, 
the Incas never lived in Christian territories, did not know about Christi-
anity, and never took over European territories. Nonetheless, normative 
instruments such as the Requerimiento, Alexandrian Papal Bulls, and Ca-
pitulations were based on similar theological and philosophical presup-
positions as the ones used in the normative doctrines, which justified the 
use of force against Jews and Muslims by European nations.49 
After the success of Christopher Columbus in “discovering” new 
territories, the Spanish Crown decided to expand its geopolitical influ-
ence in the New World.50 For this expansion, Spain used normative justi-
fications such as the papal bulls. One of the presuppositions reflected in 
the papal bulls was the right of Christian kings to take over territories that 
did not belong to other Christian nations. This was known as the “right 
of discovery” which was based on Roman law concepts.51 
The Inter caetera divinai was one of the main papal bulls used by 
Spain to justify the conquest of the New World. This normative instru-
ment recognized Spain’s victory against Muslims who occupied Chris-
tian Spanish territories in Granada.52 Because of this recognition, Spain 
was rewarded with the authority to conquer the territories of “infidel” 
 
 46. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial 
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 52. Id. at 80. 
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nations in the New World.53 From the Inca’s perspective, as an indigenous 
people, Spain was a mysterious foreign authority from an unfamiliar 
place, and granted their territory and other indigenous peoples’ territories 
to an unknown king. These unjust actions were done to change the Inca 
culture, and military force was used to diminish the indigenous popula-
tion.54 
The papal bull Inter caetera divinae indicated the pope had an ap-
ostolic power, which was initially given by Jesus Christ to the Apostle 
Peter. It also asserted that the pope granted jurisdiction over the New 
World to the Spanish Crown. The papal bulls’ coercive force was based 
on the threat of excommunication for Christian rulers who violated their 
provisions.55 Additionally, the Capitulations of Santa Fe was an im-
portant normative instrument for the relations between Spain and the New 
World. In 1491, Christopher Columbus made a request to King Ferdinand 
and Queen Isabella to support his efforts to travel and discover a new 
route to Asia.56 Historian Lyle McAlister writes: “[I]n April 1492 Isabella 
and Ferdinand gave a patent to Columbus known as the Capitulations de 
Santa Fe . . . [i]n return for his enterprise, the Catholic Kings appointed 
him viceroy, admiral, and governor in all the lands he might discover 
. . . .”57 
Capitulations were agreements between the Spanish Crown and 
conquerors of the New World on issues of jurisdiction, finances, and oth-
ers.58 Through these capitulations, the Spanish Crown both regulated 
Spanish citizens actions in indigenous territories, and also granted them 
discovery, conquest, and settlement authority.59 The main normative in-
strument that gave jurisdiction and authority to Francisco Pizarro to con-
quer and colonize the Inca Empire was the Capitulation of Toledo. On 
July 26, 1529, in the city of Toledo, Spain, Queen Isabella and the Su-
preme Council of Indies signed the Capitulation of Toledo.60 The 
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Capitulation of Toledo recognized Francisco Pizarro as governor and 
general Captain of Peru, and it also granted him the authority and juris-
diction to conquer and colonize the Inca Empire. Supposedly, the Castil-
ian Crown had the authority to grant jurisdiction to Pizarro over the Incan 
realm because the Pope granted the Spanish Crown jurisdiction over the 
New World in the Alexandrian Papal Bulls. Regarding the Capitulation 
of Toledo, Jose Antonio del Busto writes: 
On the 26th of July, 1529, the Capitulation of Toledo was signed 
in the city of Toledo, Castile, the New. In this document, the 
Crown, nominally represented by the empress Isabel . . . and the 
counsellors of the Royal and Supreme Council of Indies, named 
Francisco Pizarro governor, captain general, and main bailiff of 
Peru.61 
The Capitulation of Toledo granted Pizzaro the authority to create 
an army, acquire horses for war, grant repartimientos (distributions of 
indigenous persons), distribute gold, and evangelise indigenous people.62 
The Capitulation of Toledo also describes Pizarro’s merits and mentions 
he discovered Peru and the city of Tumbes. Additionally, it asserts that 
Pizarro used his own finances in those expeditions.63 In general, the Ca-
pitulation of Toledo authorized Pizarro to continue the discovery, con-
quest, and colonization of Peru.64 
The norms of the Capitulation of Toledo clearly established the 
Spanish Crown’s responsibility in the conquest and colonization of the 
Incan realm. The Capitulation of Toledo was based on the doctrinal un-
derstanding of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope who could grant the 
territories of the New World to the king of Spain. Therefore, the Spanish 
Crown had the authority to grant indigenous territories to its citizens. 
Father Montesinos, a Dominican missionary, spoke against the un-
just treatment of the indigenous people of the New World and defended 
their human dignity.65 As a reaction to reform movements, such as the 
one led by Montesinos, the Spanish Crown decided to “humanize” its 
treatment of indigenous people in the New World by promulgating the 
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Laws of Burgos (1512-1523).66 In describing those laws, Salord Bertrán 
writes: 
In those laws, the Crown recognized its obligation to govern the 
Indians consistent with natural law and ethics. Although some 
historians consider that because it did not prohibit the “enco-
mienda” (the control of land and indigenous persons by colo-
nists), it did not establish an authentic foundation in favour of 
the rights of the Indians.67 
The Laws of Burgos were promulgated considering the situation on 
the island of Española and expanded to Puerto Rico and Jamaica. These 
laws were also valid during the conquest of the Inca realm. Despite the 
existence of some just norms in the Laws of Burgos, there were also un-
just ones, such as the Requerimiento. In regards to the Requerimiento, 
Lyle McAlister writes: 
This instrument summarized the genesis of just title . . . and 
called on the Indians to acknowledge the pope as ruler of the 
world and, in his stead, the king of Castile by virtue of donation. 
It then informed them that if they accepted the summons they 
would be received as loyal vassals, but if they did not, they 
would be deprived of their liberty and property . . . .68 
The Requerimiento was one of the main normative instruments used 
to justify the conquest of the Inca Empire. The Requerimiento was based 
on the concept of the unity of humankind as part of God’s creation,69 and 
explained that from this common origin, the world was divided into di-
verse kingdoms.70 According to it, “[f]rom all the people, God, our Lord, 
gave authority to one, who was named St Peter, to be the lord and superior 
over all human beings of the world and whom all should obey . . . .”71 
This means that according to the Requerimiento, St. Peter was granted all 
of the kingdoms and jurisdictions of the world and authority over people 
of all beliefs, including Christians, Jews, and Muslims among others. He 
was also named Pope, which meant that he was the governor of all human 
beings. This authority was also given to the successors of St. Peter, the 
subsequent Popes. 
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The Requerimiento explains that the papal authority continues until 
the present.72 The Requerimiento was used, by Spanish conquerors, to 
justify their authority over indigenous territories. According to it: “[o]ne 
of the last popes, who succeeded him [St Peter] . . . as lord of the world 
donated this Islands and lands . . . to the said King and Queen and their 
successors in this kingdom with all that exists in them . . . .”73 The Re-
querimiento demanded that indigenous nations recognise the universal 
authority of the pope and European emperor.74 The Spanish conquerors 
wanted indigenous nations to recognize Spain’s sovereignty over the 
New World. If indigenous nations rejected the Requerimiento, they 
would suffer the following consequences: 
With God’s help, we will powerfully attack you and we will 
make war everywhere and in all possible manners. We will sub-
jugate you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and our 
Highnesses. We will take you, your women, and your children, 
and we will make you slaves . . . We will also take your proper-
ties . . . The deaths and damages which will happen . . . will be 
your fault and not the fault of our Highnesses, ours or of the 
people who came with us.75 
As part of the Spanish strategy for the conquest of the Inca Empire, 
Fray Vicente de Valverde, in the Inca city of Cajamarca, explained 
(through his interpreter Martinillo de Poechos) the medieval Spanish le-
gal colonial discourse of the Requerimiento to the Incan King Ata-
hualpa.76 Valverde said that Atahualpa had to accept Christianity and the 
universal jurisdiction of the pope and the emperor. If Atahualpa rejected 
the Requerimiento, the Spaniards could use force against him. King Ata-
hualpa rejected the conqueror’s demands. This gave the conquerors the 
normative excuse they needed to use force against the Incan king and his 
people.77 Vitoria rejects the normative foundations of the Requerimiento 
and condemns the massacre of Cajamarca, which was the beginning of 
the conquest of the Inca Empire. 
A comparative analysis between the text of the Requerimiento and 
Vitoria’s writings shows how he opposed it.78 The Requerimiento recog-
nized the universal authority of the pope on earthly matters.79 However, 
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Vitoria believed the pope did not have authority on earthly matters. The 
Requerimiento explained the universal Lordship of Jesus Christ, which 
was transmitted to the Apostle Peter, and then transferred to the pope to 
give him power. However, according to Vitoria, Christ did not transfer 
political power to the pope. The pope could not have universal political 
power by natural law, positive law, or by the law of nations.80 
Contrary to the discourse of the Requerimiento, Vitoria believed that 
the pope did not have the political power to take away the sovereignty of 
indigenous nations and give it to the king of Spain. Moreover, even if the 
pope had such power, he could not grant it to the king of Spain. Regarding 
his rejection of the pope’s authority over indigenous nations and the doc-
trines of the Requerimiento, Vitoria stated: “ . . . if the barbarians refuse 
to recognize any dominion (dominium) of the pope’s, war cannot on that 
account be declared on them, nor their goods seized.”81 Francisco de Vi-
toria rejected the arguments of some canon lawyers, especially Hostiensis 
and Silvestre Prierias, who believed in the temporal authority of the pope 
over the entire world.82 Vitoria rejected the idea of an unlimited papal 
authority on earthly matters, which was the foundation of the Requeri-
miento.83 Vitoria believed that the pope did not have dominium potestate 
civili.84 
Vitoria indicated it was self-evident that the universal authority of 
the pope could not be sustained by either natural or human law.85 The 
only possible source of the pope’s authority on earthly matters was divine 
law. However, Vitoria believed that Christ did not give the pope universal 
jurisdiction on earthly matters.86 Vitoria sustained his view by indicating 
that the pope did not have spiritual jurisdiction over non-Christians, and 
therefore he could not have jurisdiction over temporal matters.87 He also 
argued that even if the pope had temporal jurisdiction, he could not have 
given it to secular rulers because if it existed, it would have belonged to 
the institution of the papacy.88 
Because Francisco de Vitoria recognized the temporal authority of 
the pope on earthly matters, which were directly related to spiritual ones, 
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the pope could invalidate civil laws of Christian countries if they pro-
moted sinful behaviour.89 He could also order Christian sovereigns to stop 
wars which damage the spiritual wellbeing of their people.90 The pope 
could occasionally appoint new Christian sovereigns.91 If the majority of 
indigenous people became Christian, the pope could impose Christian 
sovereigns to indigenous nations. In a limited sense, the pope had access 
to the two sources of power, secular and ecclesiastical.92 
For Vitoria, it was very clear that the pope did not have jurisdiction 
over non-Christian nations.93 Consistent with this view, just wars could 
not be waged against indigenous nations and their territories could not be 
taken away based on papal authority.94 Vitoria believed that even if in-
digenous nations rejected Jesus Christ as saviour, war could not be waged 
against them. Therefore, it would be illogical and contradictory to wage 
wars against them because they rejected papal authority.95 
In his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria recognized the limited juris-
diction of the king of Spain in the New World.96 Even assuming that in-
digenous nations were sovereign, similar to European nations, for Vito-
ria, they could have been under the authority of a higher sovereign—the 
king of Spain. This was based on his view on the existence of higher and 
lower levels of territorial and political dominium (dominium altum and 
dominium bassum).97 Despite his recognition of a certain type of domin-
ium of the Spanish Crown, he rejected a European emperor’s universal 
authority. 
The recognition of a European emperor’s authority over indigenous 
territories was another foundation of the Requerimiento. Vitoria argued 
against the view of Bartolus of Sasoferrato, who recognized the authority 
of the European emperor over the entire world.98 If the emperor could 
only have dominium totius orbis, it could be by natural law, human law, 
or divine law. Based on Thomas Aquinas’ views, Vitoria indicated that 
by natural law all human beings were free, and therefore the emperor 
could not have dominium over the entire world.99 Vitoria only recognized 
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the dominium parents had over their children and husbands over their 
wives to be consistent with natural law.100 
Regarding divine law, Vitoria distinguished two possibilities: (1) 
there was an emperor before Christ came to earth, or (2) Christ estab-
lished an emperor. Vitoria indicated that before Christ, there was no em-
peror over the entire world because the Jewish people were not subject to 
any universal emperor, such as Nebuchadnezzar. Also, Hebrew law pro-
hibited the recognition of any foreign sovereign.101 Vitoria indicated that 
after Noah, the world was divided into various territories and kingdoms, 
and the descendants of Noah created diverse nations.102 
Vitoria indicated that, in Christ’s humanity, it was not certain that 
Christ had temporal authority. Vitoria wrote: “. . . it is by no means cer-
tain that Christ was temporal master of the world according to his human-
ity - more probably not, since the Lord himself seems to have asserted 
‘[m]y kingdom is not of this world’ (John 18:36).”103 Vitoria thought that 
even if Jesus Christ had temporal authority, the scriptures did not mention 
that he left it to an emperor.104 To prove his point, Vitoria mentioned the 
division of jurisdiction between the Western and Eastern part of the 
Christian European Empire. 105 
Vitoria rejected the universal authority of the emperor by human law 
because there was not an enactment (lex) which could have granted him 
such authority. Even if there was such a law, it would be invalid because 
an emperor would not have jurisdiction to create it.106 He wrote: “. . . the 
emperor did not have universal jurisdiction before the enactment of the 
law, the enactment could not be binding on those who were not his sub-
jects.”107 
Francisco Suarez, consistent with Vitoria’s views, also rejected the 
emperor’s universal jurisdiction. He believed that the Roman emperor 
was neither the lord of the universe nor had universal jurisdiction over 
the entire world.108 The emperor did not receive universal jurisdiction 
from God, was not elected by the nations of the world, nor did he conquer 
the world by war.109 Suarez believed that there was no worldwide 
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consensus to grant universal power to the Roman emperor.110 He was 
given that authority by the Roman people; therefore, his authority was 
limited to that jurisdiction.111 Jesus Christ did not grant the pope authority 
over temporal matters.112 Therefore, the pope could not give the emperor 
any power he did not have, such as secular earthly power. 113 In the An-
dean region, Solórzano de Pereira followed Vitoria’s ideas and believed 
that the New World was not under the jurisdiction of the European em-
peror.114 
Vitoria rejected the use of deception or coercion to force indigenous 
nations to accept agreements such as the Requerimiento, writing: 
The barbarians do not realize what they are doing; perhaps, in-
deed, they do not even understand what it is the Spaniards are 
asking to them. Besides which, the request is made by armed 
men, who surround a fearful and defenceless crowd. Further-
more, since the barbarians already had their own true masters 
and princes, as explained above, a people cannot without rea-
sonable cause seek new masters, which would be to the detri-
ment of their previous lords.115 
Vitoria’s rejection of the doctrinal elements of the Requerimiento 
was a significant contribution against one of the central 16th century 
Spanish normative discourses which justified the conquest of the New 
World. 
The Capitulations of Toledo, the Alexandrian Papal Bulls and the 
Requerimiento were medieval normative instruments which granted 
Spain legal authority to conquer the Inca and other indigenous territories. 
Vitoria’s rejection of the doctrinal foundations of those normative instru-
ments was based on his belief that positive laws, which contradicted nat-
ural law, were not true laws.116 Vitoria’s rejection of the theological and 
philosophical foundations of the normative instruments which justified 
the conquest of the New World created a doubt about the legality of the 
Spanish actions.117 This also created the conditions for the creation of new 
legal instruments, known as the New Laws of the Indies, applicable to the 
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international relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the 
New World. 
Vitoria’s normative doctrines influenced the making of the New 
Laws of the Indies and other normative instruments,118 which shaped the 
actions and decisions of the king of Spain, the Council of Indies and other 
Spanish institutions.119 The New Laws of the Indies, also known as the 
Laws and Ordinances Newly Made by His Majesty for the Government 
of the Indies and the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians or 
New Laws, addressed issues regarding the structure of the Spanish colo-
nial regime in the New World and its treatment of indigenous persons.120 
The Council of the Indies in Seville and the Viceroyalties of New 
Spain and Peru, among others, were responsible for implementing the 
New Laws. Those laws were promulgated to recognise the humanity of 
the Incas and other indigenous nations. The Spanish conquerors in Peru 
rejected the New Laws and refused to abolish the encomienda which was 
an institution like slavery. 121 
The Spanish Viceroy, Blasco Núñez de Vela, was responsible for 
the application of the New Laws of the Indies in Peru to ameliorate the 
situation of the Incas and other indigenous people. The Spanish conquer-
ors, led by Gonzalo Pizarro, opposed the New Laws and the actions of 
Blasco Núñez. The conquerors assassinated Núñez in order to stop the 
implementation of the laws.122 The norms of the New Laws became part 
of a codification of the general Laws of the Indies, a body of colonial 
Spanish law, which was applied since the conquest of the New World 
until the formation of independent Latin American nations.123 
 For Vitoria, before the Spanish arrival to the New World, there 
were no legal justifications for the conquest of indigenous nations. There-
fore, consistent with Vitoria’s ideas, the Spanish conquest of the Inca 
realm did not have legal justifications. If Vitoria’s rejection of fundamen-
tal colonial doctrines is properly considered, it cannot be concluded that 
he was the founder of a colonial and ethnocentric international normative 
discourse. Rather than being peripheral in Vitoria’s doctrinal structure, 
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his rejection of the pope and European emperor’s authority in the New 
World is of central importance. 
V.  FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, THE CONQUEST OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Even though Francisco de Vitoria recognised that the law of nations 
was a part of natural law, he also acknowledged its positive law elements. 
How was he able to integrate the natural and positive aspects of the law 
of nations? Vitoria integrated will and reason based on his view of eternal 
law as the source of integration and unity of all systems of law. He also 
used the scholastic dialectic method to reconcile opposite concepts. Re-
garding integrative jurisprudence, Professor Harold Berman believes that 
“[p]rior to the eighteenth century, positivist, naturalist, and historicists 
theories were not separate ‘schools’ but rather three complementary per-
spectives on law.”124 
Francisco de Vitoria had an integrative perspective of law. This ap-
proach was seen in his law of nations’ doctrines. For example, respect for 
the right to life was considered a fundamental norm of natural law, and 
grave violations of natural law justified the application of the law of na-
tions to use force against countries which systematically killed innocent 
persons. 
The scholastic dialectic method served to integrate contrary ideas. 
Francisco de Vitoria’s use of this method is seen in his comparison of 
opposite perspectives to find truth. He often states his opponents’ views 
first, then contradicts those statements, proving the logical and intellec-
tual superiority of his perspective or asserting the synthesis of both posi-
tions. 125 The interaction and interrelation between natural law and posi-
tive law is seen in Vitoria’s perspective on the law of nations.126 
According to him: 
. . . there are certainly many things which are clearly to be set-
tled on the basis of the law of nations (ius gentium), whose der-
ivation from natural law is manifestly sufficient to enable it to 
enforce binding rights. But even on the occasions when it is not 
derived from natural law, the consent of the greater part of the 
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world is enough to make it binding, especially when it is for the 
common good of all men.127 
Regarding Vitoria’s views on the law of nations, Juan Cruz indicates 
that Vitoria’s ideas were based on the recognition of “the anthropological 
and ethical dimensions of original sin, which disturb human nature.”128 
Cruz believes that Thomas Aquinas recognised the existence of a law of 
sin or lex fomitis. This was an internal inclination of human beings to-
wards evil and selfishness, which existed in human nature because of 
original sin.129 In his work On Homicide, Vitoria also recognized the ex-
istence of the law of sin.130 Vitoria followed Thomas Aquinas’ view that 
human beings, initially, received from God a law consistent with their 
good and rational nature.131 As a result of original sin, human beings often 
choose to act against their nature and rational thinking.132 For Cruz, the 
lex fomitis was a presupposition recognised by Vitoria and the Spanish 
scholastic school of thought which explains the function of the law of 
nations.133 Regarding the differences between the law of nations and nat-
ural law in Vitoria’s thinking, Juan Cruz writes: 
. . . if “natural law” responds to a nature, which . . . keeps deter-
minant aspects of human beings, the “law of nations” exists to 
resolve contradictory tensions which human nature is penalized 
and weakened with . . . Because of this, in the reasoning used to 
deduce each concrete “law of nations,” natural law is in the main 
premise, the application of the theological hypothesis in the mi-
nor premise, and the formulation of the correspondent law in the 
conclusion. This makes a concrete “law of nations” the expres-
sion of a convenient adjustment to save the natural law formu-
lated in the main premise. In this sense, only through the theo-
logical hypothesis, the law of nations comes closer to natural 
law, but it comes closer to positive law because of the delibera-
tion and voluntary effort of human beings in the process of ad-
mitting and reaching consensus.134 
For Cruz, Vitoria believed that the law of nations was convenient 
for the existence of human beings because of their fragility and social 
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nature.135 Regarding the integrative nature of the law of nations, Teófilo 
Urdanoz writes: “[t]his harmonic conception of Vitoria’s law of nations 
prevailed in the next centuries . . . Even the first scholars distinguished 
an ‘ius gentium’ natural and the positive norms of ‘ius gentium voluntar-
iou’ according to the terminology of Grotius.”136 
Vitoria acknowledged the authority of the international community 
to create laws of universal validity reflected in the law of nations which 
were based on the consensus of nations. The natural law aspect of the law 
of nations implied the participation of humankind in eternal law. Eternal 
law was also the final source of authority for the positive aspect of the 
law of nations, and its violations were considered sins. Regarding this 
concept Vitoria said: 
. . . international law has not only the force of a pact and agree-
ment among men, but also the force of a law; for the world as a 
whole, being in a way one single State, has the power to create 
laws that are just and fitting for all persons, as are the rules of 
international law. Consequently, it is clear that they, who violate 
these international rules, whether in peace or in war, commit a 
mortal sin; moreover, in the gravest matters, such as the invio-
lability of ambassadors, it is not permissible for one country to 
refuse to be bound by international law, the latter having been 
established by the authority of the whole world.137 
David Kennedy’s main criticism of Vitoria’s ideas is about the unity 
of moral and legal concepts. For him, Vitoria was a primitive writer be-
cause of his religious worldview which integrated divine, natural, and 
positive law.138 The problem with Kennedy’s analysis is that he does not 
consider Vitoria’s ideas in their historical context. In the 16th century 
Spanish intellectual context, the integration of natural and positive laws 
was possible because of the belief in the existence of eternal law which 
served as a foundation for the integration of all types of laws. 
Francisco de Vitoria rejected the medieval doctrine of discovery, 
which justified the Spanish conquest of indigenous nations. However, he 
believed that the Spanish presence in the New World could be justified 
because of the natural law principle of communication and fellowship 
between nations. For him, the rational and social nature of human beings 
was the foundation for the relations between individuals and for the 
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relationships between political communities. The principle of natural 
communication and fellowship was the foundation for the norms of free 
trade, travel, and evangelism. Vitoria’s justification for the Spanish pres-
ence in the New World was based on these norms.139 Robert Williams 
believes that Vitoria’s proposal of international norms regarding the right 
to travel, trade, and religious freedom were, in fact, Spanish norms which 
were created to justify the Spanish conquest of the New World.140 
Francisco de Vitoria accepted, in general, the validity of the medie-
val law norm of discovery. This norm stated that nations could occupy 
territories which did not belong to any other nation (terra nullius). How-
ever, Vitoria rejected the application of that norm in the case of the in-
digenous nations of the New World which had legitimate political com-
munities and dominion over their territories.141 
Vitoria’s reasoning was sustained by the fact that indigenous nations 
were rightful owners of their territories. Therefore, Spain could not dis-
cover and take over territories which already had owners. Vitoria indi-
cated that indigenous nations could also have discovered Spain.142 How-
ever, this would not have justified the use of force against indigenous 
nations. Therefore, the Spaniards could not occupy territories which le-
gitimately belonged to the Incas, Aztecs, and other indigenous nations. 
This aspect of Vitoria’s ideas cannot be underestimated. For the 16th cen-
tury Spanish context, the rejection of the right to discovery, as a norm 
applicable to the conquest of the New World, was an important effort to 
promote a universal perspective which favoured the interests of indige-
nous political communities. 
Regarding the natural law of nations’ norm of hospitality to foreign 
visitors, Vitoria said: “ . . . it is considered inhumane to treat strangers 
and travellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to 
behave hospitably to strangers. This would not be the case if travellers 
were doing something evil by visiting foreign nations.”143 Vitoria be-
lieved that since the creation of the world there was a common ownership 
of property. Because of this, every human being could travel and visit any 
part of the world. For him, this norm was not abolished by the division of 
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property (division rerum).144 This natural law of nations’ norm required 
welcoming and showing hospitality to foreign visitors.145 Indigenous peo-
ple, consistent with natural law, were supposed to show love to other fel-
low human beings and allow the free entry of Spanish visitors to their 
territories.146 Indigenous positive laws could not contradict that funda-
mental norm of natural law.147 Regarding this, Vitoria wrote: 
. . . if the Spaniards were not allowed to travel amongst them, 
this would be either by natural, divine or human law. But they 
are certainly allowed to do so by divine and natural law. But if 
there were a human enactment (lex) which barred them without 
any foundation in divine or natural law, it would be inhumane 
and unreasonable, and therefore without the force of law.148 
In the 16th century Spanish context, the norm that recognized the 
Spanish people’s right to travel to indigenous territories was not consid-
ered inherently antagonistic to the common good of humankind or to the 
interests of indigenous nations. Vitoria’s doctrine included the condition 
of the peaceful implementation of that norm and respect for the interests 
of indigenous political communities.149 However, a more universal per-
spective would have considered the indigenous sovereigns’ will to deny 
the entry of Spanish citizens to indigenous territories for any reason. Al-
ready in 1672, Samuel Pufendorf made this criticism.150 In rejecting Vi-
toria’s ideas, he said: 
Furthermore, it is crude indeed to try to give others so indefinite 
a right to journey and live among us, with no thought of the 
numbers in which they come, their purpose in coming, as well 
as of the question whether, in passing through without harm and 
visiting a foreign land, they propose to stay but a short time, or 
to settle among us permanently, as if upon some right of theirs.151 
For Vitoria, one of the main Spanish objectives in the New World 
was to trade with indigenous nations. Vitoria’s norm, which recognized 
the right to free trade, could have been considered universal and just in 
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the 16th century Spanish context if trade benefited all sides. However, 
this was not the case. While Vitoria acknowledged the reciprocity princi-
ple in international trade, he disregarded the unequal levels of power and 
its impact on the relationships between Spain and indigenous nations.152 
Regarding Vitoria’s view, Robert Williams says: “Vitoria had elevated 
the profit motive to an extremely privileged status in his totalizing dis-
course of a universally obligatory natural Law of Nations. Mercantile 
self-interest was conceptualized as binding nations to one another.”153 
For Antony Anghie, indigenous people were unable to fulfill the 
Spanish norm of free trade.154 Therefore, any indigenous violation of that 
norm was considered an injury against the Spaniards.155 China Mieville 
indicated that to talk about free trade in the 16th century historical context 
was absurd because of the difference of power between Spain and indig-
enous nations.156 These criticisms are consistent with historical facts. 
However, Vitoria recognised that both indigenous nations and Spain had 
the right to reciprocal trade if this did not damage the interests of indige-
nous nations.157 Regarding this, Vitoria wrote: 
. . . the Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbarians, so 
long as they do no harm to their homeland. In other words, they 
may import the commodities which they lack, and export the 
gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance; and 
their princes cannot prevent their subjects from trading with the 
Spaniards, nor can the princes of Spain prohibit commerce with 
the barbarians.158 
Vitoria recognized that there were certain lands in indigenous terri-
tories which were held in common between indigenous nations and Span-
ish people.159 This clear ethnocentric view was used to justify the Spanish 
takeover of certain indigenous nation’s goods and property.160 Vitoria 
also applied this ethnocentric view to gold, and gold was one of the main 
reasons for the Spanish invasion of the New World. Vitoria justified the 
takeover of indigenous gold based on the principle of common 
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ownership.161 However, Vitoria said that if the exportation of gold from 
indigenous territories was contrary to the interests of indigenous nations, 
Spanish rulers had the obligation to end that type of unjust trade.162 
Vitoria believed that trade was the foundation for the relations be-
tween Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World.163 He also 
believed that even if the Spaniards had to leave indigenous territories, 
trade between Spain and indigenous nations could continue.164 This 
would have allowed the Spanish Crown to continue increasing its income 
by taxing gold and silver which were exported from indigenous territo-
ries.165 Vitoria compared the Spanish presence in the New World with the 
Portuguese presence in Brazil.166 The difference for him was that the Por-
tuguese based their international relations with indigenous nations on free 
trade and not on colonization.167 
The norm that allowed the evangelization of indigenous people was 
consistent with 16th century Spanish concepts of international justice. Vi-
toria believed that this favored indigenous people’s interests because it 
gave them the opportunity to accept eternal salvation.168 However, au-
thors critical of Vitoria’s views interpret his norm of evangelism as an 
instrument of colonialism and Christian oppression.169 Regarding this, 
Robert Williams said: 
Vitoria’s discourse supplemented this papal power with the 
recognition that Christians possessed autonomously grounded 
rights under the Law of Nations to travel, trade, and preach the 
gospel in barbarian lands without first obtaining a papal license. 
In Vitoria’s discourse of New World conquest, reason as well as 
Rome were granted the right to initiate enforcement of Christian 
Europe’s universally binding norms and values in lands pos-
sessed by heathens and infidels.170 
Onuma Yasuaki believes that Vitoria’s efforts to impose Christian-
ity in the New World proves the ethnocentric colonial characteristics of 
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his normative ideas.171 Regarding Vitoria’s justification for the conver-
sion of indigenous people to Christianity, Anghie writes: 
[O]nce Vitoria outlines and consolidates the authority of a sec-
ular jus gentium, which is administered by the sovereign, he re-
introduces Christian norms within this secular system; proselyt-
ising is authorised now, not by divine law, but the law of nations, 
and may be likened now to the secular activities of travelling 
and trading . . . Now, Indian resistance to conversion is a cause 
for war, not because it violates divine law, but the jus gentium 
administered by the sovereign.172 
Vitoria had complex views regarding the evangelization of indige-
nous peoples. He justified the Spanish use of force to protect indigenous 
people who converted to Christianity.173 He believed that where there 
were a great number of indigenous converts to Christianity, the pope had 
the authority to replace “pagan” kings with Christian ones.174 Vitoria’s 
justification of the Spanish conquest for the evangelization of indigenous 
people had three elements: first, force could not be used to oblige indig-
enous nations to convert to Christianity; second, force could be used if 
indigenous nations did not allow Spanish missionaries to share their faith; 
and third, if the use of force would result in extreme violent actions, 
which could become a hindrance for the evangelization of indigenous na-
tions, wars should not be waged.175 
The rejection of using force to oblige indigenous nations to convert 
to Christianity, and the conditional element of Vitoria’s justification to 
use force to allow the preaching of Christianity, was consistent with 16th 
century universal perspectives of Spanish authors such as Bartolomé de 
las Casas.176 However, Vitoria’s justification to use force to allow the 
preaching of Christianity was consistent with ethnocentric views such as 
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s.177 A more universal norm would have al-
lowed indigenous nations to have the freedom to reject or accept any 
Spanish religious efforts. 
For Spanish scholastic thinkers such as Vitoria, the peaceful evan-
gelization of indigenous people was a central reason for the Spanish 
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presence in the New World.178 Vitoria justified the use of force to guar-
antee the Spanish “right” to share the Catholic faith.179 Vitoria did not 
indicate if indigenous people, such as the Inca, should also have had the 
freedom to share their faith in Wiracocha and other deities. 
Unlike Vitoria, who never lived in the New World, Bartolomé de 
las Casas knew well the consequences of the application of the natural 
law of nations to indigenous people. This was because he lived in the 
New World and was aware of the great injustices committed by Spanish 
conquerors.180 Other than the peaceful evangelization of indigenous na-
tions, de las Casas believed there was no reason for the Spanish presence 
in indigenous territories.181 
Antony Anghie’s and other scholars’ criticism of Francisco de Vi-
toria’s international legal ideas as inherently unjust, ethnocentric, and co-
lonial applies better to Sepúlveda’s views. The ideas which influenced 
Sepúlveda’s thinking were based on the following presuppositions: the 
ethnic inferiority of the people of the New World, the idolatry of indige-
nous nations as a sign of their inferiority, and the practice of human sac-
rifice as a sign of their irrationality.182 
Sepúlveda’s understanding of the law of nations, which he equated 
with human natural law, had strong ethnocentric presumptions. For him, 
the law of nations did not apply to “barbarian” indigenous nations be-
cause they were outside humanity.183 For Sepúlveda, natural law was de-
termined by the opinion of intelligent persons.184 Consequently, he be-
lieved “naturally and ethically superior people should determine what is 
just according to nature.”185 Sepúlveda recognized that there was a part of 
natural law which was immutable, but there were also natural precepts 
that changed according to circumstances.186 According to Sepúlveda, pos-
itive law derived from natural law.187 Therefore, to him there were two 
types of natural law: one which applied to human beings and animals, and 
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another that applied only to human beings, known as ius gentium.188 Fran-
cisco de Vitoria rejected this perspective and recognized the existence of 
only one natural law that applied to all human beings. One of Sepúlveda’s 
main presuppositions was that the law of nations applied only to what he 
considered to be “civilized” nations.189 His understanding of civilized na-
tions excluded indigenous people of the New World which he considered 
objects of the law.190 
For Sepúlveda, to be a Christian meant to be “civilized” and Euro-
pean, and to be an indigenous person meant to be a “barbarian” and not 
part of humankind.191 Therefore, Sepúlveda’s cultural ethnocentric per-
spective on natural law was based on ethnic stereotypes and the defense 
of the interests of one culture. This perspective led to the disregard of 
violent actions committed by Spain, such as the killing of innocent indig-
enous people. Sepúlveda justified his view regarding the inferiority of 
indigenous people based on an ethnocentric interpretation of law. Ac-
cording to him: 
[I]t will always be just and consistent with natural law that such 
people will be submitted to the empire of culturally superior and 
humane princes and nations, so that because of their virtues and 
the prudence of their laws, they will take away their barbarity 
and transform them to a more humane life and to the cult of vir-
tue. And if they reject such empire, it can be imposed on them 
by weapons and such war will be just, as the natural law declares 
it.192 
Sepúlveda’s perspective on natural law was based on the survival of 
the fittest doctrine. This was contrary to fundamental Christian scholastic 
principles such as respect for the inherent dignity of human beings. For 
Sepúlveda, there were mainly two types of nations.193 The first type were 
“civilized” nations which had political communities and obeyed natural 
law.194 The second type of nations were “uncivilized” because they con-
stantly violated natural law.195 For Sepúlveda, indigenous nations could 
not have political communities because they were sub-human, evidenced 
by their primitive cultures, idolatry, and underdeveloped economic 
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systems.196 But, Sepúlveda disregarded the fact that supposed “civilized” 
nations also were capable of grave violations of the norms of natural law. 
According to Sepúlveda, the most important principle of natural law 
was “that the perfect must prevail and dominate over the imperfect, the 
excellent over his contrary.”197 Sepúlveda viewed the Inca, Aztec, and 
other indigenous nations as inferior and inhuman; therefore, the laws 
which regulated the relations between the superior nation, Spain, and in-
ferior nations had to reflect that asymmetry. Manuel García Pelayo, re-
garding Sepúlveda’s ideological foundations that justified the conquest 
of the New World, writes: “[t]he problem is manifested in the incompat-
ibility of a Natural Law which human beings know because of its quality, 
and another conception of the same juridical area, which is restricted to a 
part of humankind, and that only a selected minority can know.”198 
For Sepúlveda, indigenous people were inherently evil and had an 
inferior intellect.199 Therefore, the Spanish conquest was consistent with 
his version of natural law, which indicated that “barbarian” nations had 
to submit to civilized ones.200 Contrary to Sepúlveda’s perspective, Vito-
ria believed that the natural law of nations applied to all nations, including 
indigenous nations.201 This was an effort to transcend the Spanish 16th 
century cultural setting and find a common ground between Spain and 
the indigenous nations of the New World. Vitoria’s intention was to find 
common human nature and apply natural law norms to all nations.202 
Contrary to Sepúlveda’s inherently ethnocentric views, Vitoria be-
lieved that natural law applied to nations from diverse cultures including 
the indigenous of the New World.203 Vitoria’s view was based on the 
recognition of the existence of one human nature.204 This was contrary to 
Sepúlveda’s view on the existence of a civilized European human nature 
and a sub-human indigenous one.205 Vitoria’s natural law of nations’ doc-
trine was an effort to apply what he considered to be universal norms to 
political communities from diverse civilizations. However, that effort 
could also be considered a discourse which promoted ethnocentric norms 
as if they were universal. 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 83. 
 198. Id. at 13. 
 199. Fernández-Santamaria, supra note 182, at 437. 
 200. Id. at 436-37. 
 201. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 278-79. 
 204. Id. at 279. 
 205. Fernández-Santamaria, supra note 182, at 437. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:47 PM 
74 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
The norm of free trade could be considered just if Spain and the 
indigenous nations of the New World had similar levels of socio-eco-
nomic development. Vitoria did not carefully consider the implications 
of the implementation of the natural law of nations’ norms to specific 
historical circumstances in which Spain could have imposed its will on 
indigenous nations. 
Vitoria lacked the historical jurisprudential component of what Har-
old Berman describes as the integrative jurisprudence of pre-enlighten-
ment Christian thinkers.206 Because of this, the problem with Vitoria’s 
law of nations’ ideas was that norms which could justly apply to the re-
lations between nations, had ethnocentric consequences when applied in 
concrete historical and cultural settings such as the ones of the New 
World. In part, this was because Vitoria did not have a deep understand-
ing of indigenous cultures. Unlike other Spanish thinkers such as Bar-
tolomé de las Casas, he never lived in the New World. Vitoria did not 
properly consider the historical realities of the indigenous nations of the 
New World and the Spanish conquest. If he did, he could have suggested 
the application of free trade norms, which considered the unequal rela-
tions of power between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New 
World. He also could have forbid the Spanish exploitation of indigenous 
natural resources. 
One of Antony Anghie’s main criticisms of Vitoria’s international 
legal ideas is the imposition of Spanish normative standards to the indig-
enous nations of the New World.207 This is a valid criticism because those 
standards were used to subjugate and exploit indigenous nations.208 How-
ever, the rejection of Vitoria’s proposal about the existence of natural law 
norms could have been used to justify actions of extreme violence prac-
ticed by indigenous nations, such as human sacrifice, and Spanish con-
querors, such as massacres. Vitoria’s intention was probably not to create 
an inherently unjust ethnocentric system of law to justify his country’s 
conquest and colonization of indigenous nations. Most likely, he believed 
that he was justly applying universal principles of natural law to diverse 
civilizations such as Spain and the Inca of the New World. 
VI.  VITORIA’S NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR 
In the 16th century Spanish context, one of the main conflicts of 
worldviews was between those who believed that only power politics was 
the foundation for international relations between nations, and those who 
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recognized the existence of a just universal normative order that all na-
tions should respect. From a political power perspective, Spain’s use of 
force to conquer and civilize “barbarian” nations was justified because of 
national interests. For example, regarding wars against the nations of the 
New World, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda wrote: 
[t]here are other just causes of war, less clear and less frequent, 
but because of this not less just, and not less founded in natural 
and divine law; and one of them is to subjugate with weapons, 
if it is not possible using other means, those that because of their 
natural condition must obey others.209 
Unlike Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitoria believed that having the 
force to conquer other nations was not enough; it was also necessary to 
obey normative precepts of the law of nations and natural law.210 Fran-
cisco Suarez was one of the most sophisticated followers of Francisco de 
Vitoria’s doctrines on the use of force.211 Suarez also rejected power pol-
itics as a reason to wage wars, stating “[t]here was an old error current 
among the Gentiles, who thought that the rights of nations were based on 
military strength, and that it was permissible to make war solely to ac-
quire prestige and wealth; a belief which, even from the standpoint of 
natural reason, is most absurd.”212 
For Vitoria, in domestic law, a political community had the author-
ity to punish violations of the normative order.213 A political community 
could also acquire jurisdiction over foreign political communities and 
could use force against them when their domestic laws did not punish 
widespread injuries against innocent human beings.214 
Vitoria and his followers applied Thomas Aquinas’ ideas regarding 
just war (bellum justum), including just causes for war (jus ad bellum), 
and the law applicable during war (jus in bello), to the concrete historical 
setting of the Spanish conquest of the New World.215 For Vitoria, it was 
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not enough for a sovereign to believe that a war was just.216 He also had 
to know the just causes for war, and had to listen to the reasoning of his 
enemies to find out if they wanted to negotiate peace agreements con-
sistent with just and reasonable principles.217 Sovereigns had the obliga-
tion to seek the advice of knowledgeable persons on the subject of war.218 
For Vitoria, wars could not be just for both sides of the armed conflict.219 
There was an exception when there was ignorance of the facts or the law, 
or when the wrong side waged a war in good faith.220 The problem with 
Vitoria’s view is that the side that had justice on its side did not always 
win wars, as was seen in the case of the Spanish-Inca war of the 16th 
century. 
One of Vitoria’s main concerns was to make certain that the Spanish 
actions in the New World were just.221 He wanted to ensure that the Span-
ish sovereigns were not sinning by acting contrary to the law of con-
science.222 For Vitoria, a sovereign had to ensure the justice of his actions 
in war.223 If a sovereign leader of a nation falsely believed that his side 
was just in a war, he had the obligation to restore what was taken from 
the enemy side upon realizing the injustice of that belief.224 
In the 16th century, there were doubts about the morality of Chris-
tian involvement in wars.225 Vitoria’s commentaries on Thomas Aquinas 
show that he believed Christians could lawfully wage wars; Vitoria ar-
gued that leaders of nations were established to defend their republics.226 
Vitoria, consistent with Aquinas’ views, believed that the republic had 
authority against its enemies to avenge wrongdoings, recover goods, and 
punish evil.227 Vitoria, like Aquinas, rejected pacifist arguments which 
indicated Christians could not participate in wars under any circum-
stances.228 
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For Vitoria, the sovereigns of nations had the responsibility to wage 
wars only when there were no other options.229 This was because all hu-
man beings were created in God’s image, and wars often caused the kill-
ing and persecution of innocent human beings.230 Also, sovereigns had 
the responsibility to seek peace and not war.231 Another norm indicated 
that, in times of war, the prince should seek justice and the self-defense 
of his commonwealth and not the destruction of his enemies.232 Once vic-
tory was achieved, the winner should act as an impartial judge.233 The 
decisions must be just for the injured side, but should also consider the 
interest of the defeated side and should not seek its destruction.234 
Francisco de Vitoria believed that the “world” granted the leaders 
of nations the authority to punish foreign nations that violated the natural 
normative order.235 According to Vitoria, republics had the authority to 
defend and avenge offenses against their citizens.236 He equated the sov-
ereign authority of the republic with the authority of the prince.237 The 
State’s authority to punish wrongdoings was not limited to its domestic 
jurisdiction, it could also be used internationally. Regarding this, Vitoria 
said: 
. . . it should be noted that the prince has the authority not only 
over his own people but also over foreigners to force them to 
abstain from harming others; this is his right by the law of na-
tions and the authority of the whole world. Indeed, it seems he 
has this right by natural law: the world could not exist unless 
some men had the power and authority to deter the wicked by 
force from doing harm to the good and the innocent.238 
Vitoria’s recognition of the legality of the use of force in cases of 
violations of the natural normative order was consistent with Thomas 
Aquinas’ medieval doctrines of war.239 Vitoria further developed Aqui-
nas’ doctrines that nations had authority to use force as a just punishment 
against other nations.240 His writings were an effort to give a normative 
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justification for the Spanish presence in the New World, as well as un-
dermine arguments which were based only on power-politics.241 
In the 16th century Spanish historical context, it was not unreason-
able to recognize the norms of communication, travel, and trade as foun-
dations for the international relations between Spain and the indigenous 
nations of the New World. However, if that meant that the Spanish could 
take over the territories of indigenous people, such as the Inca, and be-
come its new sovereign, then that part of Vitoria’s normative discourse 
could have served as a justification to conquer, colonize, and exploit the 
human and natural resources of indigenous nations. Regarding this, An-
tony Anghie opines: “Vitoria’s scheme finally endorses and legitimizes 
endless Spanish incursions into Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently in-
nocuous enunciation of a right to ‘travel’ and ‘sojourn’ extends finally to 
the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of norms 
which are inevitably violated by the Indians.”242 
However, for Vitoria, the normative principle of natural partnership 
and communication, which was the foundation for the norms of travel 
and trade, did not apply when the Spaniards injured indigenous people.243 
For example, Vitoria recognized that in the case of the conquest of the 
Inca Empire, there were extremely evil actions committed by Spanish 
conquerors against indigenous peoples.244 He also believed that the Incas 
did not violate the natural law of nations’ norms.245 However, he believed 
that other indigenous nations, such as the Aztec, violated natural law.246 
Vitoria specifically mentioned the practice of human sacrifice in Yuca-
tan, which he considered a grave violation of natural law which could 
have justified the Spanish use of force.247 
Vitoria believed that some indigenous nations, such as the Aztec, 
were responsible for injuries against innocent people.248 Although this 
could justify the Spanish use of force, there was a previous condition 
which required respecting the interests of indigenous people. Because of 
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this, Vitoria used the scholastic dialectic method to balance the applica-
tion of the norms of the natural law of nations with exceptions for their 
implementation. Regarding this, James Muldoon writes: 
[o]n the one hand the method provided a structured basis for an-
alysing a problem in an orderly way, setting out pros and cons 
clearly and enabling the reader to see the consequences of a 
course of action. On the other hand, the method can lead to pa-
ralysis of the will, balancing each argument for action against a 
reason for not acting.249 
Vitoria’s conclusion on the illegality of the Spanish use of force 
against the Inca Empire was influenced by the scholastic dialectic 
method, as well as his doctrine on the conditionality of the implementa-
tion of the norms of the natural law of nations.250 According to Vitoria, 
the Spaniards had the right to travel within indigenous territories so long 
as they did not hurt indigenous people.251 On this, Vitoria said: 
“[a]mongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and trav-
ellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave 
hospitably to strangers. This would not be the case if travellers were do-
ing something evil by visiting foreign nations.”252 
Vitoria believed indigenous nations could not have prohibited the 
presence of Spanish immigrants in their territories if those immigrants 
did not behave in a wrongful manner.253 Regarding this, he said, “[s]ince 
these travels of the Spaniards are (as we may for the moment assume) 
neither harmful nor detrimental to the barbarians, they are lawful.”254 Vi-
toria also believed that free trade was just when the Spaniards did not 
damage the interests of indigenous nations. Regarding this, he said, “ . . . 
the Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbarians, so long as they 
do no harm to their homeland.”255 Vitoria also conditioned the Spanish 
right to acquire citizenship in the New World to respect for the require-
ments of indigenous communities. Regarding this, he said, “[c]onse-
quently, it seems he would enjoy the same privileges as the rest, at least 
as long as he accepted the same burdens as they.”256 
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Vitoria believed that the Spaniards should have demonstrated to in-
digenous people that they did not have the intention to harm them. Re-
garding this, he said, “the Spaniards ought first to remove any cause of 
provocation by reasoning and persuasion, and demonstrate with every ar-
gument at their disposal that they have not come to do harm, but wish to 
dwell in peace . . . .”257 Despite Vitoria’s doctrines on the conditionality 
of the Spanish presence in the New World, the application of the natural 
law of nations’ norms to the unequal relations of power between Spain 
and the indigenous nations could have led to colonial and unjust results. 
Consistent with Onuma Yasuaki’s view, Vitoria’s norms could unjustly 
apply to indigenous political communities because they did not have the 
power and economic development to fairly trade with Spain or travel to 
Europe.258 
There are two elements in Vitoria’s views that seem to be contradic-
tory. On the one hand, Vitoria believed that Spanish conquerors should 
not hurt indigenous people’s interests. On the other hand, he indicated 
that indigenous nations could not prohibit Spanish people from trading 
and immigrating into their lands. Therefore, according to Vitoria, indig-
enous nations did not have the final authority in their own territories. Vi-
toria did not consider that even the peaceful presence of Spanish people 
in indigenous territories could have been hurtful to the preservation of 
indigenous nations and their cultures. 
Contrary to Vitoria’s views, Bartolomé de las Casas believed that 
none of the indigenous nations injured Spanish people in the New 
World.259 Therefore, there was no legal justification to use force against 
any indigenous nation. On the contrary, since the beginning of the Span-
ish conquest, indigenous nations had just causes for war against the Span-
iards.260 For De las Casas, the Spanish encounters with indigenous people 
should not have had the objective of conquering and colonizing the New 
World.261 He believed that the only reason for the Spanish presence in 
indigenous territories should have been the peaceful evangelization of its 
inhabitants.262 
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VII.  VITORIA’S JUST WAR DOCTRINES AND THE BATTLE OF CAJAMARCA 
Consistent with his theological ideas, Francisco de Vitoria believed 
that indigenous people’s violations of the norms of the natural law of na-
tions were evil actions against the normative natural order which justified 
their punishment.263 From a legal perspective, these actions were consid-
ered violations of the law of nations and injuries against Spanish immi-
grants and visitors to the New World. Because of this, the use of force 
against indigenous nations was justified. Based on Thomas Aquinas’ and 
St. Augustine’s ideas, Vitoria applied just war doctrines to the conquest 
of the New World.264 Vitoria’s view on the beginning of the Spanish con-
quest of the Inca Empire in the Battle of Cajamarca is particularly im-
portant. This was one of the most significant historical facts Francisco de 
Vitoria mentioned. His doubts about the legality of the conquest of the 
New World emerged because of the atrocities committed by Francisco 
Pizarro in the Spanish war against the Inca Empire.265 
How did Vitoria apply his general just war doctrines to the Spanish 
conquest of the Inca Empire? Among the few historical facts that Vitoria 
mentioned about the Spanish conquest of the New World, the most im-
portant was the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire in the Battle of Ca-
jamarca. The Battle of Cajamarca was a crucial moment in the conquest 
of the Inca Empire, and is a key event in understanding Vitoria’s interna-
tional normative ideas. For Francisco de Vitoria, the Spanish actions in 
the city of Cajamarca (1532) violated the norms of just war.266 In that city, 
Francisco Pizarro and other Spanish conquerors met the Inca King Ata-
hualpa, who had just defeated his brother, Huascar, in a civil war. De-
scribing this meeting, the Spanish historian, Pedro de Cieza de León, 
wrote: 
[t]hey began to enter the plaza. When the squadrons reached the 
center of it, they formed a very large circle. Atahualpa entered 
after many of his captains and their people had done so. He 
passed all of them before his litter was set down. Because he 
was in the middle of the people, he stood up on top of the plat-
form. He spoke loudly that they should be brave . . . that they 
should know that [the Christians] were hiding in fear. He 
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reminded them how they had always vanquished many people 
and nations, serving under his and his father’s banners.267 
As part of the Spanish strategy, Fray Vicente de Valverde explained, 
through his interpreter, Martinillo de Poechos, the medieval colonial law 
of the Requerimiento to the Inca King Atahualpa. Valverde explained to 
him that he had to accept Christianity, as well as the universal jurisdiction 
of the pope and the European emperor. According to the norms of the 
Requerimiento, if Atahualpa rejected the Requerimiento, the Spaniards 
could use force against him.268 Fray Valverde gave a Bible to King Ata-
hualpa, but he did not understand what was given to him and threw it 
away. This action was considered a rejection of the pope, emperor, and 
Spain’s jurisdiction in the Inca realm.269 This gave the Spaniards the nor-
mative justification they needed to use force against the Inca king and his 
people. Juan de Betanzos described the massacre of Cajamarca, as fol-
lows: 
When the marquis had heard out Fray Vicente about that turn of 
events, he made his signal to the artillerymen. When they saw 
it, they fired their cannon and the harquebuses. Then everybody 
came out at once and fell upon the Inca’s men. The horsemen 
lanced them and the foot soldiers cut with their swords without 
the Inca’s men putting up any resistance . . . So many men tried 
to leave by the plaza’s gate and the Spanish were so persistent 
in killing them that a large mass of Indians, as they saw the great 
massacre they were suffering, pressed against a stretch of the 
wall that circled the plaza and toppled it under their onslaught.270 
In the massacre of Cajamarca, the Inca King Atahualpa was kid-
napped, and high-level Inca leaders and many other indigenous people 
were killed. The Spanish invasion and use of force had the objective of 
taking over the natural resources of the Incas, especially gold and silver. 
After the massacre of Cajamarca, the Spaniards kidnapped and executed 
the king of the Inca Empire. Despite fulfilling a ransom of a room full of 
gold and silver, Atahualpa was condemned to death.271 
Vitoria knew what happened in Cajamarca and believed that the 
Spanish actions were unjust and against the natural law of nations.272 In a 
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letter to his friend, Miguel de Arcos, on November 8, 1534, Vitoria ex-
pressed his opposition to Francisco Pizarro in Cajamarca.273 This was the 
beginning of Vitoria’s intellectual task to develop doctrines and a lan-
guage on the laws applicable to the international relations of Spain with 
the indigenous nations of the New World. It was also the beginning of a 
quest to apply scholastic norms and principles to relations between na-
tions. The letter was based on Vitoria’s knowledge of the Spanish actions 
in the Andean region, which he obtained from testimonies of former mis-
sionaries and soldiers who returned to Spain from the Inca realm.274 
Francisco de Vitoria, as a theologian, sought to find principles 
which reflected the 16th century Spanish scholastic view of truth and jus-
tice. He tried to influence the conscience of Spanish sovereigns and peo-
ple. Regarding the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, in his letter to 
Miguel Arcos, Vitoria wrote: 
As for the case of Peru, I must tell you, after a lifetime of studies 
and long experience, that no business shocks me or embarrasses 
me more than the corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies. Their 
very mention freezes the blood in my veins . . . I do not under-
stand the justice of the war. I do not dispute the emperor’s right 
to conquer the Indies, which I presuppose he may, most strictly; 
but as far as I understand from eyewitnesses who were person-
ally present during the recent battle with Atahualpa, neither he 
nor any of his people had ever done the slightest injury to the 
Christians, nor given them the least grounds for making war on 
them . . . But even supposing the justice in the war is all on the 
side of the Spaniards, hostilities may not proceed beyond sub-
duing them and compelling them to accept the emperor as prince 
with the infliction on them of as little damage and loss as possi-
ble. This does not mean robbing them and leaving them destitute 
of everything regarding their temporal goods . . . In truth, if the 
Indians are not men but monkeys, they are incapable of injury. 
But if they are men, and our neighbours, and as they claim vas-
sals of the emperor, I cannot see how to excuse these conquista-
dors of utter impiety and tyranny; nor can I see what great ser-
vice they do to His Majesty by ruining his vassals.275 
Vitoria believed that one of the main reasons for the conquest of the 
Inca Empire was the Spanish conquerors’ ambition to become 
wealthy.276 Consistent with his view of just causes for war, Vitoria 
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believed that the only way the Spanish actions in the Andean region could 
be justified was if indigenous people injured the Spaniards. Vitoria re-
jected the legality of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. However, 
if it was just, Vitoria indicated that the Spanish conquerors should have 
followed legal norms during war (ius in bello). Regarding this, he said: 
[b]ut even supposing the justice in the war is all on the side of 
the Spaniards, hostilities may not proceed beyond subduing 
them and compelling them to accept the emperor as prince with 
the infliction on them of as little damage and loss as possible. 
This does not mean robbing them and leaving them destitute of 
everything regarding their temporal goods.277 
Vitoria believed that Spain’s military actions should have been pro-
portionate to specific objectives. He believed that the actions of Francisco 
Pizarro and other Spanish conquerors in the Andean region were viola-
tions of fundamental scholastic norms of natural law and the law of na-
tions, including proportionality in the use of force.278 
One of the greatest weaknesses of Anghie’s, Williams’, and other 
authors’ criticisms of Vitoria’s international law doctrines, generally, and 
the law of war particularly, is their complete disregard of the Spanish 
conquest of the Inca Empire in the city of Cajamarca, a concrete historical 
event. Considering that Vitoria specifically mentioned the event and re-
jected the legality of the Spanish war against the Incas, the lack of con-
sideration of that fact does not allow one to see the possible universal and 
just consequences of Vitoria’s international legal ideas in the 16th century 
historical context. This does not mean that there were no other aspects of 
Vitoria’s just war ideas which were ethnocentric and colonial. Ideas such 
as the application of different standards for wars between European na-
tions and between Spain and “infidel” nations. 
Besides his focus on the Spanish conquest of the New World, Vito-
ria also wrote about the laws of war to address European wars with Mus-
lim nations. However, it is not clear if all his doctrines applicable to Mus-
lim nations were also applicable to the indigenous nations of the New 
World. Even if this was the case, Vitoria did not believe that the Incas 
violated the norms applicable to nations or the norms applicable only to 
“pagan” nations.279 Therefore, for Vitoria, they did not commit injuries 
which could have justified the Spanish use of force in the Incan realm.280 
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Besides his ethnocentric doctrines on just war, Vitoria had ideas of 
general universal application which respected indigenous interests, such 
as the obligation of the winner of a war to administer his victory as an 
impartial judge. Despite his biased doctrines on the ius in bello, Vitoria 
believed that the actions of the Spanish conquerors in the Andean region 
went beyond what was allowed in a just war.281 
Despite the general consistency of Vitoria’s doctrines, there were 
contradictions and inconsistencies which could be explained by his desire 
to defend the interests of his country. These interests were often contrary 
to his view of the universality of norms and the equality of human beings 
created in God’s image (imago Dei). A biased just war doctrine, which 
considered indigenous nations only as violators of the law, would not 
have highlighted the Spanish violations of the law of war in the conquest 
of the New World. 
VIII.  THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW IN THE INTERNAL 
JURISDICTIONS OF INDIGENOUS POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 
Previously it was held that Vitoria believed that the norms of travel, 
trade, and evangelism were part of the natural law of nations which in-
digenous nations and Spain should have respected in their mutual rela-
tions. In this part of the article, the right to life, as a fundamental norm of 
natural law, will be analyzed. Violations of that norm, such as human 
sacrifice practiced by indigenous nations, was one of Vitoria’s most com-
pelling justifications for the Spanish presence in the New World. Unlike 
violations of the norms of the natural law of nations in the relations be-
tween nations, in this case the violations were against natural law in the 
internal jurisdictions of indigenous political communities. Francisco de 
Vitoria believed that indigenous people could not have been unaware of 
fundamental norms of natural law, including respect for innocent human 
life.282 Therefore, human sacrifice, even if justified by cultural reasons, 
was a grave violation of natural law.283 
Vitoria did not mention the customs of human sacrifice and canni-
balism in the Inca Empire. However, he mentioned those practices in the 
Aztec realm.284 For Vitoria, this was a just reason to use force and conquer 
indigenous territories.285 He justified the Spanish conquest of the Aztec 
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Empire because of grave violations of the right to life.286 He also men-
tioned alliances between minority indigenous groups and Spanish con-
querors, in the Mesoamerican region, as a just reason to use force.287 
One of Antony Anghie’s and Brett Bowden’s main arguments 
against the justice of Vitoria’s ideas indicates that his objective was the 
imposition of Spanish norms and cultural identity on the indigenous na-
tions of the New World.288 Anghie believes that Vitoria’s normative ideas 
were an imposition of Spanish norms not only for the regulation of rela-
tions between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World, but 
also for the regulation of the relations between indigenous sovereigns and 
their citizens.289 Therefore, Vitoria tried to impose his European view of 
natural law into the internal jurisdictions of indigenous political commu-
nities. For Anghie and other authors, Vitoria believed that indigenous 
customs were against the Spanish version of the law of nations. There-
fore, the Spanish cultural identity was the standard which indigenous na-
tions had to embrace to become civilised.290 
Antony Anghie indicates that in Vitoria’s writings there is a contra-
diction between the ontological indigenous person who could obey the 
norms of natural law because of his rational capacity, and the concrete 
cultural-historical indigenous person who constantly violated Spanish 
norms.291 For him, Vitoria justified the Spanish use of force against in-
digenous nations because of the differences between Spanish and indige-
nous cultural practices.292 Anghie’s analysis can lead to the conclusion 
that respect for indigenous customs and the sovereign will of the rulers 
of indigenous nations were more important than stopping unjust violent 
indigenous nations’ customs, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism. 
Regarding the Spanish norms of natural law which applied not only 
to the relations between nations, but also to the relations between indige-
nous people inside their political communities, Anghie writes: 
. . . the Spanish acquire an extraordinarily powerful right of in-
tervention and may act on behalf of the people seen as victims 
of Indian rituals: ‘it is immaterial that all the Indians assent to 
rules and sacrifices of this kind and do not wish the Spaniards 
to champion them.’ Thus Spanish identity or, more broadly, an 
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idealized Western identity, is projected as universal in two dif-
ferent but connected dimensions of Vitoria’s system: Spanish 
identity is both externalized, in that it acts as the basis for the 
norms of jus gentium, and internalized in that it represents the 
authentic identity of the Indian.293 
The cultural practices and religious rituals, mentioned by Anghie, 
were human sacrifice and cannibalism, which were part of the religious 
customs of the Aztecs, Mayas, Incas, and other indigenous political com-
munities. Robert Williams, Antony Anghie, and other authors do not pay 
enough attention to Vitoria’s proposed norms that justify the use of force 
to end violations of the right to life of innocent indigenous persons in 
human sacrifice.294 It seems that for the 16th century Spanish historical 
context, one of Vitoria’s most compelling and universal reasons to use 
force against indigenous political communities was to save the lives of 
innocent indigenous people. 
For Vitoria, Spanish military actions which helped indigenous al-
lies, who stood up against unjust laws and oppressive sovereigns, were 
lawful. They were just because those actions were in defense of innocent 
persons and against a tyrannical power. This was based on Vitoria’s view 
of the unity of humankind and the authority of the entire world (autoritas 
totius orbis) to prevent and punish grave violations of natural law. 295 
Vitoria believed, in a just war, injured indigenous people could have 
asked Spain to help them fight against dominant oppressive indigenous 
sovereigns.296 Regarding this, he wrote, “[t]here can be no doubt that 
fighting on behalf of allies and friends is a just cause of war . . . [a] com-
monwealth may call upon foreigners to punish its enemies and fight ex-
ternal malefactors.”297 Francisco de Vitoria specifically mentioned the 
Spanish conquerors’ alliances with the Tlaxcala people.298 For a long 
time, the Tlaxcaltecs fought against the Aztecs and tried to keep their 
independence.299 The Aztecs continuously attacked them, and they re-
sisted those actions. Often, the Aztecs used Tlaxcala prisoners of war in 
human sacrifice.300 When Hernán Cortés arrived in their territory, they 
resisted the Spanish conquerors.301 However, after several battles, the 
 
 293. Id. at 22-23. 
 294. For example, see WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 50, at 99. He does not consider Vitoria’s view 
of the indigenous custom of human sacrifice. 
 295. See, e.g., MIRALLES, supra note 215, at 109. 
 296. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 289. 
 297. Id. at 289-90. 
 298. Id. at 289. 
 299. See HOWARD J. ERLICHMAN, CONQUEST, TRIBUTE AND TRADE 100 (2010). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:47 PM 
88 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
Spaniards won the war.302 The leader of the Tlaxcala people, Xiconten-
catl, offered peace to Cortés and asked him to become allies against the 
Aztecs.303 
After the Spanish conquerors were temporally defeated by the Az-
tecs, under the leadership of Cuitlahuac, and after the death of King Mon-
tezuma, they escaped to the territory of the Tlaxcala, where they reor-
ganized and went back to Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital.304 Finally, 
Cortés captured Cuauhtemoc, the new Aztec king, and defeated the Aztec 
resistance.305 
One of the few, Vitoria’s knowledge of concrete events in the rela-
tions between Spain and indigenous nations, was the Spanish alliances 
with minority indigenous groups such as the Tlaxcaltecs. He considered 
it a just reason to use force on behalf of indigenous minority groups who 
were injured by other indigenous nations who ruled their territories.306 
Regarding the Spanish protection of the Tlaxcaltecs against the Aztecs in 
New Spain, Francisco de Vitoria wrote: 
. . . whenever the barbarians themselves are engaged in legiti-
mate war with one another, in which case the injured party has 
the right to wage war, and may call upon the Spaniards to help 
them, and then share the prizes of victory with them. This is 
what is said to have happened when the Tlaxcaltecs were 
fighting the Mexicans; they made a treaty with the Spaniards 
that they should help them to defeat the Mexicans, and promised 
them in return whatever they might win by the laws of war. 
There can be no doubt that fighting on behalf of allies and 
friends is a just cause of war . . . .307 
A similar situation happened in the Spanish conquest of the Andean 
region. Indigenous nations, who were enemies of the Incas, were the main 
Spanish allies in the wars of conquest.308 Spain would not have been able 
to conquer the Inca Empire if they did not establish strategic alliances 
with indigenous nations that opposed the Incan rule in the Andean region. 
Furthermore, the Incas were divided, which made it easier for the Span-
iards to conquer them. At the end, the Spanish agreements with their 
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Andean allies (Chancas, Cañarís, and other indigenous groups) were un-
fulfilled. 309 
The norm of ‘defense of allies’ could have served as a justification 
for the Spanish actions against the Incas. However, Vitoria did not men-
tion this scenario regarding the Andean region. It seems that Vitoria be-
lieved that the doctrine of alliances, as a justification for the use of force, 
was not applicable to the case of Francisco Pizarro’s actions in the Incan 
realm.310 
From the perspective of minority indigenous groups, such as the 
Tlaxcaltecs or Chancas, it could have been considered just for the Spanish 
conquerors to intervene on their behalf. In the 16th century historical con-
text, it is difficult to know Vitoria’s motives to justify the Spanish use of 
force to help minority indigenous nations. Did Vitoria propose this doc-
trine with the only objective of justifying the Spanish conquest, or was 
he mainly concerned with the welfare of indigenous minority groups? He 
may have had both objectives. 
On one hand, it seems that he used ethical and legal norms to justify 
Spain’s imperial expansion. On the other hand, it seems that he applied 
what he considered to be just and universal norms to help indigenous 
people who suffered oppression and persecution. Vitoria indicated that 
the Romans used force for just motives, and at the same time, increased 
their empire.311 This shows that Vitoria considered the use of force for 
just motives to be consistent with Spain’s objective of conquering the 
New World. 
The norms of friendship and fellowship, as part of the social nature 
of human beings, were one of Vitoria’s foundations to justify the use of 
force in order to protect indigenous converts to Christianity and defend 
indigenous allies.312 In the first case, converts to Christianity became 
“brothers” and “sisters” of Spanish Christians because of their common 
faith. In the second case, there was a political friendship.313 For Vitoria, 
indigenous Christian converts should not have been persecuted because 
of their religious beliefs.314 If they were persecuted, Spain could have 
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used force to protect their lives. For Vitoria, this was one of the main 
reasons to use force against indigenous political communities. Regarding 
this, he said: 
. . . if any barbarians are converted to Christ and their princes try 
to call them back to their idolatry by force or fear, the Spaniards 
may on these grounds, if no other means are possible, wage war 
on them and compel the barbarians to stop committing this 
wrong. If they persist, they may exercise all the rights of war, 
sometimes including the deposition of their masters, as in other 
just wars. This third title may be advanced not only on grounds 
of religion, but on grounds of human amity (amicitia) and part-
nership (societas) since the barbarians’ conversion to Christian-
ity makes them friends and partners of us Christians . . . .315 
Vitoria believed that one of the main reasons why Spain could use 
force against tyrannical indigenous rulers was the ethical norm of loving 
and respecting others.316 Also, he believed that because indigenous peo-
ple, who were oppressed by their sovereigns, were part of the interna-
tional community, they should be protected by Spain.317 
IX.  THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW IN THE INTERNAL 
JURISDICTIONS OF INDIGENOUS POLITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE AND HUMAN SACRIFICES 
Francisco de Vitoria specifically mentioned the practice of human 
sacrifice in Yucatan. This was the first place where the Spanish conquis-
tador, Hernán Cortés arrived in the New World to begin the conquest of 
the Aztec Empire.318 The practice of human sacrifice was widespread in 
Mesoamerica and the Andean region. 
It was not only the Mayas in Yucatan who practiced human sacri-
fice. The Aztecs, Incas, and other indigenous nations of the New World 
also had religious beliefs which allowed these rituals. Aztec state ideol-
ogy encouraged the human sacrifice of prisoners of war as offerings to 
their gods.319 The Spanish ethno-historian, Bernardino de Sahagún, who 
lived in New Spain from 1529 to 1590, described the human sacrifice 
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practiced by the Aztecs as part of their worship to their gods “Xipe Totec” 
and “Huitzilopochtli.”320 Regarding this, Charles Phillips writes: 
Another important central element of Mesoamerican civilization-at 
least as far back as the Olmecs in c. 1200BC- was the use of human blood 
sacrifice to honour and propitiate the gods. Among the Aztecs, vast lines 
of prisoners of war were paraded up steep temple pyramids to be sacri-
ficed by having their hearts ripped from their chests.321 
One of the characteristics of the Inca religious worldview was the 
offering of children in human sacrifice to the mountains which were con-
sidered gods. Unlike the Aztecs, the Incas believed in giving complete 
human bodies in sacrifice without taking out any parts.322 For the Incas, 
human sacrifice was a ritual to appease and obtain blessings from their 
gods and show their power over other nations of the Andean civilization. 
Regarding the Spanish accounts of the practice of human sacrifice in the 
Andean region, Constanza Ceruti writes: 
. . . [a]ccording to these accounts, sacrifices were made for dif-
ferent reasons, such as the important events in the life of the Inca 
emperor, including his illness and death and the succession of a 
new emperor to the throne…In regional contexts, they were 
noted as often having been made to stop natural calamities, such 
as droughts, epidemics and volcanic eruptions . . . .323 
In the Andean region, ethnic groups such as the Mochica and the 
Paracas also practiced human sacrifice. Regarding the custom of Inca 
practice of human sacrifice, Nigel Davis writes: 
[a] seemingly conservative figure comes from Fray Joseph de 
Acosta, who states that when the Inca Huayna Capac died, only 
a very few years before the Conquest, a thousand human offer-
ings followed him to the next world. Acosta writes that when an 
Inca ruler died, they killed his favourites and concubines, to-
gether with servants and court officials; children were also 
slain.324 
Although the indigenous nations’ practice of human sacrifice was 
done inside their own jurisdictions, for Vitoria, foreign sovereigns, such 
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as Spain, had authority to punish “evil” actions inside the jurisdictions of 
other political communities when their own sovereigns did not do it. 
For Vitoria, Christian and indigenous nations’ general violations of 
natural law did not justify the use of force. Only the gravest violations of 
natural law, such as the killing of innocent persons, justified the use of 
force. Vitoria condemned the killing of innocent human beings by Span-
ish conquerors and indigenous people. Consistent with 16th century 
Spanish Christian views of rationality, the norm of respect for the sanctity 
of human life was considered of universal validity. Vitoria’s doctrine on 
the protection of innocent human life was based on one of the norms of 
the ten commandments of the Bible: “[y]ou should not kill.”325 Further, 
Vitoria said: “ . . .this command was always the same before the law, dur-
ing the time of the law, and in Gospel time. This is clear, because the 
natural law is never changed; it is not abrogated, limited, or extended.”326 
For Vitoria, there were some cases when the killing of human beings 
was justified. Vitoria justified the killing of human beings in self-defense 
against unjust attacks.327 However, he believed that violations of the right 
to life of innocent human beings were never justified. For Vitoria, if Az-
tec rulers exercised their political authority consistent with natural law, 
they should have stopped and punished the practice of human sacrifice.328 
Because they did not do it, the nations who had the power to stop extreme 
violent actions could justly use force to protect innocent human lives. 
When innocent persons, such as children, were victims of human sacri-
fice, Spain could legitimately use force on behalf of the authority of the 
international community.329 
Regarding the norms of natural law which indigenous people were 
supposed to obey, Professor Anghie said: “ . . . an idealised version of the 
particular cultural practices of the Spanish assume the guise of universal-
ity as a result of appearing to derive from the sphere of natural law.”330 
However, in the case of the defence of innocent human life, Vitoria’s ar-
guments had a universal perspective. For the 16th century Spanish scho-
lastic mindset, it was irrational to believe that a society, anywhere in the 
world, could survive without respecting the right to life of innocent hu-
man beings. 
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Vitoria believed that the killing of human beings in religious rituals 
and cannibalism was against natural law and divine law. 331 For Vitoria, 
consistent with Felipe Castañeda’s analysis, people who practised canni-
balism were murderers who constantly sought new victims to sustain their 
habits.332 This created the conditions for constant wars between people 
who practiced cannibalism. Therefore, they were constant violators of the 
right to life.333 Vitoria also believed that cannibalism was against the right 
to a burial because it destroyed the human body.334 
Vitoria believed the killing of innocent human beings was against 
divine law because it violated the Ten Commandments of the Bible.335 
According to Vitoria, neither an innocent person nor a criminal could be 
acceptable sacrifices to God.336 He believed all human life belonged to 
God, who was the creator of life.337 Therefore, human beings could not 
take away the life of innocent persons. He believed human sacrifice was 
the result of indigenous nations’ idolatrous worldviews.338 
For 16th century Spanish scholastic thinkers, indigenous nations 
which committed evil actions, such as human sacrifice, violated funda-
mental doctrines of the Catholic Christian worldview regarding human 
nature. Therefore, as Castañeda explains, for Vitoria, the person who 
killed human beings for religious sacrifice and ate human flesh was the 
ontological opposite of what a human being should be. 339 However, for 
Antony Anghie, Spanish Christian norms could not have served to distin-
guish right from wrong. According to Anghie: 
[t]he gap between the Indian and the Spaniard, a gap that Vitoria 
describes primarily in cultural terms by detailed references to 
the different social practices of the Spanish and the Indians, is 
now internalized; the ideal, universal Indian possesses the 
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capacity of reason and therefore the potential to achieve perfec-
tion. This potential can only be realized, however, by the adop-
tion or the imposition of the universally applicable practices of 
the Spanish.340 
For Vitoria, to end the custom of human sacrifice, it was necessary 
to change indigenous nations’ worldviews on human nature and human 
life. This means that the transformation of indigenous worldviews was 
part of the process of implementation of the norms of natural law. If this 
transformation meant the change of extreme violent practices of indige-
nous nations, which were contrary to their own interests, it could have 
been consistent with 16th century views of universal justice. However, if 
the change meant the destruction of fundamental aspects of indigenous 
cultures and the imposition of Spanish interests, then this was a colonial 
and ethnocentric excuse to conquer indigenous nations. For Vitoria, the 
efforts to evangelise indigenous people were also efforts to end the ideo-
logical foundations of human sacrifice.341 
Vitoria believed that indigenous nations’ worldviews justified the 
killing of innocent human beings in human sacrifice.342 But this was not 
the only characteristic of their norms and behaviour; he also recognized 
that indigenous people had well-established political communities. Con-
trary to Vitoria’s perspective, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda labelled indige-
nous nations as savages and constant violators of natural law and rejected 
the existence of political communities in indigenous territories.343 For 
him, human sacrifice and cannibalism were evil actions which proved the 
inherent ethnic inferiority of indigenous people and justified the Spanish 
invasion and colonization of the New World.344 
Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas had different views 
about the justification for the use of force because of the human sacrifice 
practised by indigenous nations.345 Bartolomé de las Casas justified hu-
man sacrifice done by indigenous nations because it was a “lesser evil.”346 
For him, the Spanish wars against indigenous nations produced more evil 
than the killing of innocent people in human sacrifice.347 He justified hu-
man sacrifice because for some indigenous nations it was a way of 
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demonstrating their love to God. The Aztec, Inca, Maya, and other indig-
enous nations gave their most precious persons, such as children, to their 
gods in human sacrifice.348 De las Casas argued that it was very difficult 
to change the religious worldviews of indigenous nations and their beliefs 
in human sacrifice. Regarding this, he wrote: 
[n]or is human sacrifice–even of the innocent, when it is done 
for the welfare of the entire state–so contrary to natural reason 
that it must be immediately detested as something contrary to 
the dictates of nature . . . If they offend God by these sacrifices, 
he alone will punish this sin of human sacrifice.349 
De Las Casas’ commitment to a universal perspective, which re-
spected the interests and cultures of indigenous people, included the for-
giveness of human sacrifice and the rejection of the use of force to stop 
them. Contrary to that view, Vitoria believed that, like all human beings, 
indigenous people could violate fundamental norms of natural law. In the 
case of human sacrifice, there was a clear violation of the right to life of 
their own citizens. For him, this was not a violation of Spanish subjective 
cultural standards, but a violation of a universal normative standard of 
natural law.350 
Consistent with his view on the importance of consistency between 
positive law and natural law, Vitoria indicated that positive domestic laws 
should punish human sacrifice. Regarding this, he said: “ . . . as St 
Thomas so elegantly explains, the intention of law and legislators is to 
make the subjects good . . . But they cannot be good if they live with bad 
customs; therefore it is the prince’s duty to abolish these evil rituals.”351 
For Vitoria, non-Christian sovereigns had authority to promulgate laws 
against human sacrifice and punish its violations.352 Therefore, if an in-
digenous sovereign became a Christian, he had a higher obligation to en-
act laws against human sacrifice and ensure the end of this practice. Vi-
toria believed that Christian sovereigns could enact laws consistent not 
only with natural law, but also with divine law and that their subjects, 
Christians and non-Christians, were obliged to obey those laws.353 
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Christian princes could use force to stop human sacrifice practised by 
foreign nations because it was a grave injury against innocent human be-
ings.354 
Vitoria believed that Christians could become rulers of indigenous 
nations and had authority to force them to end unnatural rituals such as 
human sacrifice.355 Vitoria believed that Christian rulers who governed 
indigenous nations had to make good laws for the temporal wellbeing of 
their subjects and consider the interests of indigenous nations.356 The im-
plementation of good laws in the Spanish colonies was essential to pre-
serve the good conscience of Spanish sovereigns.357 Regarding Vitoria’s 
view of the place of justice in punishing human sacrifice, Scott Davis 
writes “ . . . the perception of injustice formed by education in the virtues 
makes it unthinkable to stand by while others are taken to be sacrificed. 
This alone entitles the Spaniards to put an end to human sacrifice as an 
institution.”358 
X.  THE USE OF FORCE: HUMAN SACRIFICES AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Vitoria often quotes Saint Augustine, who justified the use of force 
when a nation did not punish the “wrongdoings of its own citizens.”359 
Because indigenous norms allowed human sacrifice, and indigenous sov-
ereigns did not issue punishment for human sacrifice, Vitoria believed 
that the use of force, based on the concept of the “good of the whole 
world,” could have been properly applied to Spain’s wars against indige-
nous nations.360 Regarding this, he said: 
I assert that in lawful defence of the innocent from unjust death, 
even without the pope’s authority, the Spaniards may prohibit 
the barbarians from practicing any nefarious custom or rite . . . 
This applies not only to the actual moment when they are being 
dragged to death; they may also force the barbarians to give up 
such rites altogether.361 
For Vitoria, grave violations of the right to life justified the conquest 
of the Aztec Empire, as well as the actions of Spain in the Andean 
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region.362 However, Vitoria did not mention the Inca practices of human 
sacrifice.363 For Vitoria, the objective of Francisco Pizarro and other 
Spanish conquerors in the Andean region was to exploit the natural re-
sources of indigenous people, not to save innocent human lives.364 
Francisco Suarez, like Vitoria, believed that wars should be waged 
to defend innocent human beings only in extreme circumstances.365 Ac-
cording to him, “[T]his ground for war should rarely or never be ap-
proved, except in circumstances in which the slaughter of innocent peo-
ple, and similar wrongs take place.”366 Consistent with the Spanish 
scholastic understanding of natural law, human sacrifices practiced by 
indigenous people were actions contrary to fundamental norms, such as 
“love your neighbour as yourself” and “you should not kill innocent per-
sons.”367 Regarding Francisco Suarez’s perspective on human sacrifice 
and the use of force, Doyle writes: “Suarez added that this may be done 
not only to liberate children, but also adults-even if they themselves con-
sented and wished to be sacrificed to idols. For in this, he thought, these 
adults were worse than madmen.”368 
There were other Spanish scholastic thinkers besides Suarez who 
agreed with and clarified Vitoria’s justification for the use of force 
against indigenous nations to end human sacrifice. For Diego de Covar-
rubias, human sacrifice of innocent indigenous persons was a just reason 
for war.369 According to him, the innocent people who could be killed in 
human sacrifice were fellow human beings, and there was an assumption 
that they were asking for help.370 Even if they did not ask for help directly, 
there was still the Christian duty to save the lives of the innocent.371 For 
Melchor Cano, indigenous nations and Spain could use force to protect 
the lives of innocent human beings against homicidal policies.372 
Juan de Solórzano indicated that the Incas practiced human sacrifice 
to celebrate the appointment of a new king or when their king died.373 
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According to him, around one thousand children, from four to ten years 
old, were sacrificed for those types of rituals.374 He also stated that the 
wives of dead leaders were forced to be buried alive with their hus-
bands.375 Solórzano believed that human sacrifice was “ . . . abominable 
not only for us, who by God’s favour profess the pious Christian religion, 
but also for the pagans and infidels . . . .”376 Solórzano also described the 
Aztecs’ custom of human sacrifice.377 Solórzano concluded that Spanish 
kings could wage wars against indigenous nations to force them to stop 
human sacrifice and obey natural law.378 According to him, actions 
against divine and natural law were actions against all humanity.379 
Juan de la Peña—another Spanish scholastic thinker who interpreted 
Vitoria’s doctrines—believed that even if it was consistent with their cus-
toms, it was still wrong for innocent indigenous persons to accept being 
killed in human sacrifices.380 Peña focused on innocent persons because 
he accepted human sacrifice of persons found guilty of crimes which de-
served the death penalty. Peña concluded that the war against the Aztecs 
was unjust because their human sacrifices were done against guilty hu-
man beings.381 According to him, the Spanish conquerors did not require 
indigenous nations to stop the practice of human sacrifice before using 
force. Also, the Spaniards killed more human beings in a few days than 
the Aztecs did in many years of human sacrifice.382 
For Vitoria, a just war to save the lives of innocent human beings 
should have been proportionate to that narrow objective. According to 
him, “if war is declared on the barbarians by this title, it is not lawful to 
continue once the cause ceases, nor to seize their goods or their lands on 
this pretext.”383 Vitoria did not mention when the causes for the killing of 
innocent human beings by human sacrifice ended. If the main cause for 
human sacrifice was the indigenous nations’ worldviews, which led them 
to believe that it was good to kill innocent persons for religious reasons, 
then changing this aspect of indigenous nations’ beliefs required a very 
long time.384 In the case of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, the 
 
 374. Id. at 437. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 439. 
 377. Id. at 466-67. 
 378. Id. at 439. 
 379. Id. at 469. 
 380. DE BELLO CONTRA INSULANOS INTERVENCIÓN DE ESPAÑA EN AMERICA, supra note 69, 
at 219.  
 381. Id. at 225. 
 382. Id.  
 383. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 226. 
 384. See VITORIA, supra note 332. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:47 PM 
2021]     Francisco de Vitoria on the Origins of International Law 99 
use of force against the Incas was completely disproportionate to that spe-
cific religious objective. Regarding this, Vitoria opined: 
I assume that, even if the war is fought by just title, the belliger-
ent does not thereby have the power to eject the enemy from 
their dominions (dominium) and despoil them of their property 
at whim; he can act only as far as is necessary to ward off injus-
tices (iniuriae) and secure safety for the future.385 
If the Spanish conquerors had just titles to wage wars against indig-
enous people, they did not have the right, consistent with Vitoria, to oc-
cupy their territories. This part of Vitoria’s doctrine was not pro-colonial 
because it defended the interests of indigenous nations. Regarding pro-
portionality in the use of force, Juan de la Peña, who interpreted Vitoria’s 
doctrines at the University of Salamanca, wrote: “Even when a war is 
legal to defend innocent persons, the precept of prudence should be also 
respected . . . [t]he war that is waged in defence of fellow human beings 
should not result in more damage than the one as a result of [human] 
sacrifice.”386 
One of the leading thinkers in the Andean region in the 16th century 
was José de Acosta. He agreed with the use of force to defend the life of 
innocent persons in cases of human sacrifice if it was done in a propor-
tional manner.387 Regarding this, he said: 
it is also absurd to want to defend those if the defence will pro-
duce more mortality. And it is established by infinity of testimo-
nies that many more, by far, have died in wars against the Indi-
ans than with any tyranny of the barbarians. What amount of 
sacrifices and massacres of Indians did happen because of the 
devastation caused by the sword of the Spaniards? Therefore, 
morally speaking, it would be very difficult, or better to say that 
it can never be alleged that the defence of innocents is a just 
cause for war against the Indians.388 
Vitoria’s doctrine on the use of force to end human sacrifice had a 
great influence on the Spanish scholastic perspective of war. Vitoria’s 
recognition of the principle of proportionality in the use of force to end 
human sacrifice is a remarkable effort for the 16th century Spanish his-
torical context. At that time, Spain’s main objective was to conquer and 
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colonize indigenous nations without considering the consequences of the 
use of force in the New World. 
For Vitoria, Spain could use force against indigenous political com-
munities to save innocent human lives or liberate indigenous nations who 
were oppressed by another indigenous political community. Spain could 
do this because oppressive indigenous commonwealths were not ful-
filling the objectives for their existence, which included the protection of 
the wellbeing of their citizens. In this case, the communitas orbis had the 
authority to stop grave violations against innocent persons. Because of 
this, a country with enough power, such as Spain, could use force on be-
half of the entire world. 
Considering that all human beings were part of the communitas or-
bis, the actions of Spain to save innocent human lives against the tyranny 
of the Aztecs was based on the auctoritate totius orbis. The actions of 
political communities taken on behalf of the rest of the world were con-
sidered legal even if oppressed indigenous people did not ask for help.389 
The reason for this was that innocent human beings could not forsake 
their right to life, which was given by God, who is the only one who could 
take it away. 
On the one hand, Vitoria’s justifications could be considered uni-
versal and just, consistent with 16th century views, because their aim was 
to save innocent human beings who were oppressed and persecuted by 
more powerful indigenous nations. On the other hand, under the excuse 
of changing indigenous worldviews, which allowed the practice of human 
sacrifice, and protecting Spanish allies, Spain could have justified the 
conquest and colonization of indigenous nations. 
Vitoria’s justification to use force to protect the lives of innocent 
indigenous persons was consistent with 16th century Spanish views of 
universal justice which recognized the sanctity of human life as one of its 
main foundations. The objective of protecting innocent human lives could 
not be considered ethnocentric or colonial because its aim was to protect 
the wellbeing of innocent indigenous people, whose lives were at risk 
because of the indigenous custom of human sacrifice. However, the Span-
ish disproportionate use of force was a problem that Vitoria did not sys-
tematically address. Therefore, even a principle, which could have been 
considered universal and just, could also have had ethnocentric and unjust 
consequences in its implementation. 
Authors who are critical of Francisco de Vitoria’s ideas often do not 
consider the complexity of Vitoria’s proposal of global normative 
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standards that need to be understood in the intellectual Spanish 16th cen-
tury context. In that context, ethical norms, such as respect for the sanctity 
of human life, were an essential part of the prevalent worldview. 
For Francisco de Vitoria, extreme violent actions against the sanc-
tity of human life, even if committed consistently with domestic positive 
indigenous laws, were against the natural normative order.390 For Vitoria, 
indigenous nations, such as the Aztec, could not have rationally argued 
that the systematic killing of innocent children in religious sacrifice was 
part of their sovereign will. Sovereign wills could not have prevailed over 
fundamental precepts of natural law such as respect for the right to life of 
innocent human beings. 
Although he does not specifically mention the indigenous practices 
of human sacrifice and cannibalism, Antony Anghie indicates that Vitoria 
not only tried to impose a Christian European understanding of norms for 
the relations between nations on indigenous people, but he also tried to 
force indigenous nations to follow those Spanish norms in their domestic 
affairs.391 Following Anghie’s reasoning, it can be said that Vitoria’s jus-
tification to use force to stop human sacrifice and cannibalism was an 
effort to impose norms contrary to indigenous cultures and justify Spain’s 
colonial expansion. However, it is doubtful that Vitoria’s proposal to use 
force to cease the practice of human sacrifice had the objective of justi-
fying the Spanish colonial expansion in the New World. Considering Vi-
toria’s theological beliefs in the obligation to save innocent human lives, 
he likely believed that Spain had a legal and moral obligation to stop the 
practice of human sacrifice in the New World. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
This article demonstrated that Francisco de Vitoria’s international 
normative ideas were a 16th century effort to promote just global norms 
which had ethnocentric pro-colonial components. Most of Vitoria’s pro-
posed norms were a bona fide effort to transcend his cultural setting and 
defend not only Spanish interests, but also the interests of indigenous na-
tions and the international community. 
Francisco de Vitoria’s international legal and political doctrines 
emerged because of his interpretation of historical facts about the Spanish 
conquest of indigenous nations. They also emerged because of his views 
on the nature of indigenous nations and their political communities. He 
 
 390. Contrary to this view, David Kennedy wrote: “Vitoria organizes his doctrinal system in a 
way which renders unjust and illegitimate what today would be termed exercises of sovereignty 
which conflict with each other or the moral/legal order.” Kennedy, supra note 138, at 14-15. 
 391. See ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 327. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:47 PM 
102 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
interpreted those facts through the lenses of 16th century Spanish scho-
lastic legal, theological, and philosophical concepts. In Vitoria’s histori-
cal setting, the conquest of the New World was justified by medieval law 
doctrines of legal instruments such as the Requerimiento, Capitulations, 
and Alexandrian Papal Bulls. Francisco de Vitoria rejected the doctrinal 
foundations of these documents and proposed the application of natural 
law in the international relations between Spain and the indigenous na-
tions of the New World. 
Francisco de Vitoria’s international normative ideas emerged in a 
specific historical-intellectual context and answered specific questions 
which were relevant for that time. Vitoria applied Thomas Aquinas’ scho-
lastic ideas and canon law doctrines to the historical context of the Span-
ish conquest of the New World. In that context, there were emerging 
views of universal justice such as the one of Bartolomé de las Casas, who 
considered the interests of indigenous people even above the interests of 
his own country. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda represented another view of 
universal justice which identified Spanish national interests with the in-
terests of humankind. Francisco de Vitoria’s international normative doc-
trines were closer to De las Casas’ universalism. However, it had some 
elements consistent with Sepúlveda’s ethnocentric colonial views. 
Vitoria recognized the source of civil power in the commonwealth 
and not in ecclesiastical authority. Consistent with that belief, “infidel” 
nations, such as the Inca, could have had legitimate political communi-
ties. Unlike medieval authors, who rejected the existence of political 
communities in “infidel” nations because of their sinfulness and unbelief 
in Christianity, Vitoria accepted the existence of dominion (dominium) 
and civil power (potestate civili) in non-Christian nations. In his com-
mentaries on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, he recognized the internal sov-
ereignty of indigenous nations by indicating that Christian sovereigns 
were not superior to indigenous ones, and that their territories could not 
be taken away.392 In his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria equated the Inca 
Empire with Castile and Aragon. Those political communities were part 
of Spain, but they had a limited external sovereignty.393 
Vitoria believed that indigenous nations, like all nations, were 
obliged to obey the natural law of nations’ norms. These included the 
norms of travel, trade, and evangelism. Violations of those norms by in-
digenous nations were considered injuries against the rights of Spanish 
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visitors and immigrants in the New World.394 Those injuries were consid-
ered actions that justified the Spanish use of force as a just punishment. 
For Francisco de Vitoria, grave violations of natural law norms inside 
indigenous jurisdictions were considered offenses against God’s design 
of the universe and contrary to God’s design of human nature. Human 
sacrifice and cannibalism were grave violations of natural law norms.395 
Therefore, for Vitoria, the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New 
World could have been justified to stop and punish those practices.396 De-
spite Vitoria’s recognition of the importance of proportionality in the im-
plementation of those norms, he did not properly address the use of those 
natural law norms as an instrument to justify the conquest and coloniza-
tion of indigenous political communities.397 
This article showed that a careful analysis of Vitoria’s views on con-
crete facts regarding the Spanish conquest of the Inca and Aztec empires 
reveals that Vitoria had a limited knowledge of the history and cultures 
of indigenous nations. Because of this, he mentioned the practice of hu-
man sacrifice in the Aztec realm, but he did not acknowledge it in the 
Inca Empire, where that was also common practice. He did the same re-
garding Spanish alliances with indigenous minority groups. Vitoria justi-
fied the use of force against the Aztecs because of the Spanish conquer-
ors’ alliances with the Tlaxcaltecs. However, he did not mention the 
Spanish alliances with indigenous nations in the case of the conquest of 
the Inca Empire. 
Among other reasons, Vitoria’s rejection of the legality of the con-
quest of the Inca Empire was based on his rejection of the doctrinal foun-
dations of the Requerimiento, which was the main legal instrument to 
justify the Spanish use of force in the Andean region. Contrary to this, he 
justified the use of force against the Aztecs to end their customs of human 
sacrifice and cannibalism. Those actions were not violations of the natu-
ral law of nations in the relations between Spain and indigenous nations. 
They were violations of natural law by indigenous sovereigns against 
their own people and in their internal jurisdictions. For Vitoria, Aztec 
sovereigns violated fundamental norms of natural law because their cus-
toms allowed grave violations against the sanctity of human life. For the 
Spanish 16th century mindset, the defense of innocent human life was 
one of the most universal norms applicable to nations from diverse civi-
lizations. 
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Antony Anghie and other critical scholars disregard the fact that in 
his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria recognized that the Spanish conquer-
ors’ actions in the Inca realm were illegal. He believed that the Inca peo-
ple did not injure the Spaniards. Therefore, there was no justification to 
use force in the Andean region. For Vitoria, the Inca—like all other in-
digenous nations—had the obligation to respect the natural law of na-
tions’ norms of trade, travel, and evangelism. If they violated those 
norms, they injured the Spanish immigrants and visitors in the New 
World. However, Vitoria did not mention Inca violations of the natural 
law of nations. Therefore, Francisco Pizarro’s war against the Inca Em-
pire was illegal. For Vitoria, even if the Incas violated the natural law of 
nations, Pizarro’s use of force was disproportionate, and he therefore vi-
olated the norms of the law of war in the battle of Cajamarca.398 The con-
quest of the Inca Empire could also have been justified because of grave 
violations of natural law in the internal relations between the Inca sover-
eigns and their citizens. However, Vitoria did not mention the Inca prac-
tice of human sacrifice, either because he did not know about it or he did 
not want to mention it. 
If Francisco de Vitoria’s ideas are the starting point of international 
law, there is not a colonial ethnocentric origin of this discipline. Despite 
the contradictions and limitations of Vitoria’s international legal doc-
trines, his international legal ideas were a bona fide effort to promote just 
international norms. This was done within the limits of Vitoria’s 16th 
century Spanish intellectual-historical context and within his limited 
knowledge about the indigenous nations of the New World. 
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